The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
that
funding would be available to improve sustainability and implement
Urgent
Operational
Requirements (UORs).
•
Secondly,
if the Armed Forces were required to provide 18,000‑20,000
people
for an
emergency fire service in the event of a nationwide firefighters’
strike
(Operation
FRESCO), and the US started military action in winter
2002/3,
only the
in‑place support package and Special Forces would be
available.
18.
Mr Hoon
had commissioned further work with a view to expediting what
would
need to be
done once a decision in principle had been taken. UK
representatives at
a US
Central Command (CENTCOM) planning meeting the following week would
be
instructed
“to set our options positively but without committing us to any
specific ones”.
The MOD
would write again as soon as there was “greater clarity about the
US plan,
such that
the Chiefs can update their assessment of it (and the risks
involved) and the
Defence
Secretary can make recommendations about the best option to
pursue”.
19.
Copies of the
letter were sent to the Private Offices of Mr Jack Straw, the
Foreign
Secretary,
and the Cabinet Secretary, and to Mr John Scarlett, Chairman
of the JIC.
20.
The MOD advice
and subsequent developments in its contingency planning
during
August are
addressed in Section 6.1.
21.
Mr Rycroft
submitted the letter to Mr Blair on 31 July, as one of several
“background
papers you
commissioned at the Iraq meeting last week” for “summer
reading”.4
22.
Mr Rycroft
commented to Mr Blair:
“The
military are not yet ready to make a recommendation on which if any
of the
three
options to go for. They are continuing to work with the US
military. Nor can
they yet
judge whether the US have a winning concept. You
do not need to take
decisions
yet.”
23.
Sir David
Manning told the Inquiry that Mr Blair had said:
“… he
didn’t want to take any decision or accept any of these options. I
think in
retrospect
… this was because … this was the time … when we were pressing
for
the
Americans to consider the UN route. I think he didn’t want to give
any signal that
he was keen
to think about a military alternative …”5
24.
The other
background papers sent to Mr Blair included advice from the
FCO on
the
attitudes of allies, the history of weapons inspection, and from
Mr Scarlett on the
cohesion of
the Iraqi regime.6
Those are
addressed later in this Section.
4
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Background
Papers’.
5
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, page 36.
6
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Background
Papers’.
96