9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
421.
On 11 January,
Mr Asquith and Mr McDonald called on Prime Minister
Maliki, who
was
enthusiastic about the proposed surge of US troops announced by
President Bush
422.
Mr McDonald
stressed that reconciliation remained high on Mr Blair’s
agenda
and asked
what the future was for the process in Iraq. Prime Minister Maliki
confirmed
that
reconciliation was of strategic importance to Iraq and that he
intended to persevere
with
it.
423.
Mr Asquith
asked Prime Minister Maliki to intervene to end the Basra
Provincial
Council’s
lack of co‑operation with MND(SE). Prime Minister Maliki made clear
that he
believed
that the Provincial Council was acting outside its
remit.
424.
On 11 January,
Mrs Beckett and Mr Browne appeared before a joint session
of
the Foreign
Affairs and Defence Select Committees.228
Mr Browne
told members that
“the United
States’ plans are entirely consistent with our objectives and
activities in
MND (SE)”.
425.
In response to
a question on UK involvement in the decision to surge,
Mr Browne
said that
the British deputies to US military commanders in Iraq were
involved in the
discussions.
He added:
“Every
single aspect of the structure of the way in which this coalition
operates at
a military
level is reflected in agreements and in joint committee documents
and we
have a
continuing role in the consideration of them and in the revision of
them.”
426.
The following
day, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary told him that reaction to
President
Bush’s
speech had been “pretty negative in the US, less so in
Iraq”.229
427.
Mr Blair
wrote on his Private Secretary’s update note: “I still need more
info on
Basra and
have we established the Joint Working yet, led by
military?”230
428.
Lt Gen Lamb’s
weekly report on 14 January reported some important
practical
developments.231
He advised
that:
•
The Iraqi
Government had selected Lt Gen Aboud as the commander
for
the Baghdad
Security Plan earlier that week: “A professional soldier, who
is
understood
to have been well respected by his officers and men, chosen for
his
non‑sectarian
background (no known militia or political ties), he is regarded
as
a good
man; and is likely to be able to call upon significant political
muscle.”
227
eGram
1246/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 11 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Call on
Prime Minister Maliki,
11
January’.
228
Select
Committee on Defence, Examination
of witnesses, 11
January 2007, Q2 & Q22.
229
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 12 January 2007, ‘Iraq update, 12
December [sic]’.
230
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Banner to Prime Minister, 12 January 2007,
‘Iraq Update,
12
December’.
231
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 14 January 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (241) 14 Jan
07’.
79