3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
“a false
choice”. The paradox was that diplomacy had to be backed by a
credible threat
of force to
achieve Iraq’s disarmament by peaceful means. He
wished:
“… we lived
in a different world where this was not necessary, but … the choice
is
not ours as
to how this disarmament takes place – the choice is Saddam
Hussein’s
… he can
act with astonishing speed when he chooses to … It may take time
to
fabricate
falsehoods but the truth takes only seconds to tell.”
1134.
In response to
Mr de Villepin’s concerns about automaticity, Mr Straw
added that
the threat
of force or its use had:
“… always
been conditional. It would be utterly irresponsible and in defiance
of our
solemn
duties to the Council for us to walk into a situation where force
was used
automatically
…”
1135.
In conclusion,
Mr Straw stated that the UK remained “committed to
exploring
every
reasonable option for a peaceful outcome and every prospect of a
Council
consensus”.
He asked, on behalf of the UK, US and Spain as co-sponsors, for a
revised
draft of
the second resolution to be circulated.
1136.
In his memoir,
Mr Straw wrote that he had deliberately picked up Mr de
Villepin’s
words and
“There was not a word in my speech about the intelligence. It was
the
indisputable
facts of Saddam’s behaviour that convinced me we had to
act.”345
1137.
Mr Georges
Chikoti, the Angolan Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated
that
the reports
from Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei showed that Iraq’s
co-operation was “relatively
insufficient”
and called on Iraq to take a more energetic and pro-active
role.346
He
suggested
that the progress made was associated with specific benchmarks and
dates.
That might
be a model for strengthening the scope and intrusiveness of
inspections.
1138.
Mr Chikoti
noted that international community, regional and
sub-regional
organisations
and international public opinion had been calling for the
peaceful
disarmament.
Those were “valid and legitimate concerns” but they could not
be
“interpreted
or transformed into an unwillingness to act”. The responsibilities
of the Council
included
“exhausting all diplomatic and peaceful means to achieve
such disarmament”.
1139.
Mr Belinga-Eboutou
stated that Cameroon was pleased to note the momentum
of
inspections was “well established”. UNMOVIC’s report from the
inspectors showed
real
progress but also made clear that the results had “been very
limited so far”.
Cameroon
did not believe that Iraq had “yet taken the final opportunity
afforded by …
resolution
1441”. It was in favour of inspections but they should not go on
“indefinitely”.
The Council
should “together seek, in good faith, a credible alternative to war
and to
endless inspections”.
345
Straw
J. Last Man
Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan,
2012.
346
UN Security
Council, ‘4714th Meeting Friday 7 March 2003’
(S/PV.4714).
385