5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
891.
Referring to
the statement issued at the Azores Summit calling on all
members
of the
Security Council to adopt a resolution challenging Saddam Hussein
to take
a strategic
decision to disarm, Mr Straw told the House of
Commons:
“Such a
resolution has never been needed legally, but we have long
had
a preference
for it politically.”
892.
Mr Straw
stated that there had been “intense diplomatic activity to secure
that end
over many
months, culminating in the last 24 hours”. Despite “final efforts”
by Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
the previous evening and his own conversations with his
“Spanish,
American,
Russian and Chinese counterparts that morning”, the Government
had:
“…
reluctantly concluded that a Security Council consensus on a new
resolution
would not
be possible. On my instructions, Sir Jeremy Greenstock made a
public
announcement
to that effect at the United Nations at about 3.15 pm UK time
today.”
893.
Mr Straw
continued that, since the adoption of resolution 1441 in
November
2002, he,
Mr Blair and Sir Jeremy Greenstock had “strained every nerve”
in search of
a consensus
“which could finally persuade Iraq by peaceful means, to provide
the full
and
immediate co-operation demanded by the Security
Council”.
894.
Mr Straw
stated that it was significant that “in all the discussions in the
Security
Council and
outside” no-one had claimed that Iraq was “in full compliance with
the
obligations
placed on it” and:
“Given
that, it was my belief, up to about a week ago, that we were close
to
achieving a
consensus that we sought on the further resolution. Sadly, one
country
then
ensured that the Security Council could not act. President Chirac’s
unequivocal
announcement
last Monday that France would veto a second resolution
containing
that or any
ultimatum ‘whatever the circumstances’ inevitably created a sense
of
paralysis
in our negotiations. I deeply regret that France has thereby put a
Security
Council
consensus beyond reach.”406
895.
Mr Straw
told the House of Commons that the proposals submitted by
France,
Germany and
Russia for “more time and more inspections” sought to “rewrite”
resolution
1441. They
“would have allowed Saddam to continue stringing out
inspections
indefinitely,
and he would rightly have drawn the lesson that the Security
Council was
simply not
prepared to enforce the ultimatum … at the heart of resolution
1441”.
896.
Mr Straw
pointed out that “in the event of non-compliance” Iraq should, as
OP13
spelt out,
expect “serious consequences”. Mr Straw stated:
“As a
result of Saddam Hussein’s persistent refusal to meet the UN’s
demands,
and the
inability of the Security Council to adopt a further resolution,
the Cabinet
has decided
to ask the House to support the United Kingdom’s participation
in
406
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 17 March
2003, columns 703-705.
161