The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
621.
In response to
a question from Mr Tony Worthington (Labour) about whether
he
had been
party to plans, reported in the US press, for a US general to
administer Iraq,
Mr Blair
replied:
“… no
decisions have yet been taken on the nature of how Iraq should
be
administered
in the event of Saddam’s regime being displaced by force. I said
earlier
that I
thought that the role of the UN had to be well protected in such a
situation.
The
discussions that we are having on that matter are proceeding well.
When we
have
reached conclusions and decisions, we can announce them so that
people can
622.
Parliamentary
debate on Iraq on 25 and 26 February is addressed in more detail
in
623.
Sir David
Manning and Dr Rice discussed post-conflict issues on 25
February.272
Both agreed
the need to think soon about the “aftermath” and to keep discussing
the
role of the
UN.
624.
Sir David told
Dr Rice that it would be important to show that the UN was
fully
involved in
running post-Saddam Hussein Iraq:
“If we had
gone the UN route to disarm him, it would be entirely consistent
to
maintain
the UN route to rebuild the country once his regime had gone.
There
were also
important questions of expertise and financing to consider. The
UN
was a
critical source of both. This was an important issue for the Prime
Minister,
although he
was clear that UN involvement must not be at the expense of
efficient
administration
and effective reconstruction.”
625.
Sir David
offered to send Dr Rice a paper setting out the UK’s
ideas.
626.
In late
February, the MOD established a small “Red Team” within the
Defence
Intelligence
Staff (DIS) to give key planners in Whitehall an independent view
of
intelligence
assumptions and key judgements.
627.
Key
judgements in the first report produced by the DIS Red Team
included:
•
the need
for Coalition Forces to prevent the emergence of a
security
vacuum;
270
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 25
February 2003, column 137.
271
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 25
February 2003, column 123.
272
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
420