12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1245.
Mr Browne
told the House of Commons on 11 September that 360
additional
personnel
would be deployed to reinforce the effort in Basra.1161
That
comprised an
extended
deployment of the Theatre Reserve Battalion and an uplift in Royal
Engineers,
Royal
Marines (one boat troop) and Royal Military Police (one troop) to
augment training
of the
IPS.
1246.
At the DOP(I)
meeting on 14 September, the objectives of Op SALAMANCA
were
described
to Ministers as being to:
•
increase
Iraqi political grip on the issue, by having a visible Iraqi face
on the plan
and active
involvement in the operation; and
•
increase
the confidence and competence of the ISF.1162
1247.
On 15
September, Maj Gen Shirreff reported that the police were
“still incapable
of
providing even the most basic level of security; rather they are a
major cause of
insecurity”.1163
He
anticipated that during Op SALAMANCA there would be “a
concerted
and
sustained effort by Police Training Teams” to “turn those police
stations capable
of
improvement into police stations that are capable of providing
basic security in their
local
areas”. His aim was “to cull the unredeemable and rehabilitate the
‘just about’
salvageable”.
1248.
In a meeting
with Gen Casey, Prime Minister Maliki was reported as saying
that
“the
security situation in Basra was not bad enough to warrant an
operation that would
upset the
political balance”.1164
1249.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lt Gen Shirreff described gaining
approval from the
Iraqi
Government as an “absolutely non‑stop grind”:
“Maliki
said he didn’t want this operation to proceed, despite … declaring
a state of
emergency.
So I then went up to Baghdad … got to see Maliki and eventually
briefed
him and
persuaded him that this operation should continue.”1165
1250.
Lt
Gen Shirreff told the Inquiry that even travelling to meet
Prime Minister Maliki
was
difficult, with Gen Hamadi refusing to fly for two hours
because he had received a
call from a
Sadrist Minister who said, “This operation isn’t to
continue”.
1251.
In response to
the difficulties in securing approval, Op SALAMANCA was
refined
and
repackaged as “a reconstruction and development operation enabled
by MNF and
MNF‑led
security”.
1161
House of
Commons, Official Report, 11 September 2006, column
111WS.
1162
Minutes, 14
September 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
1163
Minute
Shirreff, 15 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
15 September 2006’.
1164
Minute
Shirreff, 21 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
21 September 2006’.
1165
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 17‑19.
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