11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
244.
At the end of
December 2005, the British Embassy Baghdad wrote to the FCO
to
describe
conversations with Iraqi and US officials about the possibilities
for reform of the
de‑Ba’athification
Commission.198
245.
The Embassy
described the Commission as “an inherently political body”, and
said
that there
was no real prospect of appeal against its decisions. The new
Constitution
offered a
potential opportunity to reform the de‑Ba’athification Law, but
also the risk
of
deepening existing divisions. Article 134(6) obliged the Council of
Representatives
to
establish a committee to review acts of the de‑Ba’athification
Commission and
government
agencies. In the Embassy’s opinion that was “a real opportunity to
set in
motion
concrete reform of the DBC”.
246.
Although “the
ultimate goal” was repeal of the de‑Ba’athification Law
and
dissolution
of the Commission, possible steps to address concerns about
the
de‑Ba’athification
process included:
•
imposing
procedural checks to “choke the Commission in its own
bureaucracy”;
•
removing
politically active individuals from the Commission;
•
pressing
for the extradition to Iraq of senior Ba’athists suspected of
criminal
activity;
and
•
publication
of a final report by the Commission, indicating that its work
was
complete.
247.
Attached to
the Embassy’s message was a minute written by the IPU for
Mr Patey
248.
The IPU set
out more information about the composition and operation of the
DBC.
Its six
serving Commissioners were all from the Shia community as two
positions allotted
to the
Kurdish parties had never been filled. The DBC did not hold formal
meetings, and
its only
active members were Dr Chalabi, Mr Maliki and Sheikh
Jalal al‑Din al‑Sagheer.
249.
The IPU also
described Article 7 of the new Constitution, which banned
the
glorification
and promotion of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq and its symbols. Although
the text
had been
“continually watered down”, the final text specified that its
provisions would be
regulated
by a law. The IPU judged:
“The
regulating law will be a yardstick testing attitudes towards
de‑Ba’athification –
on the one
hand it could be an opportunity to seek concrete reform and repeal
of
CPA Order
No.1 (the de‑Ba’athification Law). But on the other hand, it could
be used
as an
opportunity to widen and deepen de‑Ba’athification, or restrict the
activities of
political
groups which contain former Ba’athists. That said, because it [sic]
such a
political
hot potato, it may not be one of the laws prioritized as important
in the new
parliament.”
198
eGram
21802/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 31 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Reforming
de‑Ba’athification’.
199
Minute
Wilson to HMA, 10 December 2005, ‘Iraq: de‑Ba’athification:
Possible Next Steps’.
47