The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
unlikely to
wish to reduce US force levels by more than five brigades by the
autumn.
He concluded:
“Of course,
the Iraqis also have a vote – and I continue to judge that
accelerated
transition
(aka an end to occupation) will be their determined
intent.”
510.
Lt Gen
Houghton also reported “widespread, largely Sunni, demonstrations
against
electoral
fraud”.
511.
In a meeting
with former Prime Minister Allawi in early January,
Mr Blair
emphasised
that the UK intended to be much more “hands on” in helping to form
a
government
this time round:
“It was
essential to promote the emergence of a unity government … The
US/UK
could not
of course force the formation of an NUG [National Unity Government]
but
there was
strong international support for this among regional governments
and
from the UN
… as well as the coalition. Within Iraq also, there was strong
disposition
512.
In discussion
with President Bush on 10 January, Mr Blair said that it would
help
to unlock
outstanding aid pledges if the new government set out a “forward
programme”
covering
security, coalition posture and reconstruction, which the UN and
the coalition
could get
behind:
“This would
allow us to explain again that we were only in Iraq to help a
democratic
government
withstand anti-government forces, and that a reduction in
violence
would make
it easier for us to draw down.” 241
513.
Mr Straw
visited Basra and Baghdad in early January.242
He met
representatives
of
political parties from all the main communities, reinforcing the
need for a unity
government.
In his view, achieving that mattered more than who became Prime
Minister.
514.
Mr Straw
reported to Mr Blair that some Sunni representatives told him
that they
had been
“cheated out of seats”. He responded that “they must accept the
election
results
once confirmed or they will be pitting themselves against the whole
international
community”.
515.
In preparation
for a discussion at DOP(I) on 12 January 2006, the British
Embassy
Baghdad
submitted “a plan for engagement with Sadrists”.243
The Embassy
proposed
to approach
senior figures with Sadrist links who could ultimately persuade
Muqtada
al‑Sadr
that dialogue would be in his interests.
240
Letter
Prentice to Quarrey, 3 January 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s meeting with
Iyad Allawi, Amman,
2 January’.
241
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 10 January 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush:
Middle East
issues’.
242
Letter
Straw to Prime Minister, 11 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Post-Elections and
Government Formation’.
243
eGram
343/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 8 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Sadrist
Outreach’.
574