Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
if the UK failed to persuade the US, it risked “being drawn into a huge commitment
of UK resources for a highly complex task of administration and law and order for
an uncertain period”.
598.  By March 2003, having failed to persuade the US of the advantages of a UN‑led
interim administration, the UK had set the less ambitious goal of persuading the US to
accept UN authorisation of a Coalition‑led interim administration and an international
presence that would include the UN.205
599.  On 19 March, Mr Blair stated in Parliament that discussions were taking place with
the US, UN and others on the role of the UN and post‑conflict issues.206
600.  Discussions continued, but, as the invasion began:
The UK had not secured US agreement to a Security Council resolution
authorising post‑conflict administration and could not be sure when, or on what
terms, agreement would be possible.
The extent of the UN’s preparations, which had been hindered by the absence
of agreement on post‑conflict arrangements, remained uncertain. Mr Annan
emphasised to Ms Short the need for clarity on US thinking so that UN planning
could proceed207 and told Sir Jeremy Greenstock that he “would not wish to see
any arrangement subjugating UN activity to Coalition activity”.208
Potential international partners for reconstruction and additional Coalition
partners to provide security continued to make their post‑conflict contributions
conditional on UN authorisation for Phase IV (the military term for post‑conflict
operations).209
601.  Despite being aware of the shortcomings of the US plan,210 strong US resistance
to a leading role for the UN,211 indications that the UN did not want the administration
of Iraq to become its responsibility212 and a warning about the tainted image of the UN
in Iraq,213 at no stage did the UK Government formally consider other policy options,
including the possibility of making participation in military action conditional on a
satisfactory plan for the post‑conflict period, or how to mitigate the known risk that
the UK could find itself drawn into a “huge commitment of UK resources” for which
no contingency preparations had been made.
205 Paper Iraq Planning Unit, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV: Authorising UNSCR’.
206 House of Commons, Official Report, 19 March 2003, columns 931‑932.
207 Telegram 501 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq Humanitarian/Reconstruction:
Clare Short’s Visit to New York’.
208 Telegram 526 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq Phase IV: UN Dynamics’.
209 Paper FCO, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV Issues’.
210 Minute Drummond to Rycroft, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq Ministerial Meeting’.
211 Minute Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq Strategy’.
212 Public hearing, 15 December 2009, page 5.
213 Paper Middle East Department, 12 December 2002, ‘Interim Administrations in Iraq: Why a UN‑led
Interim Administration would be in the US interest’.
80
Previous page | Contents | Next page