The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
396.
Mr Straw
briefed a meeting of Cabinet the same day that:
“This
Security Council resolution would put the Coalition’s work in Iraq
on a
firm basis,
including for oil sales …The Attorney General’s advice … had
been
followed.
For example, no change in institutions was being imposed before
the
resolution
was passed.”264
397.
The resolution
confirmed that there would be a role for the UN, exercised
through
a Special
Representative to the Secretary-General, but made it clear that the
UN would
not have
the lead responsibility for the administration and reconstruction
of Iraq, which
would fall
to the CPA.265
398.
The key
sections of the resolution:
•
called for
help in the reform, rebuilding, stabilisation and security of
Iraq,
including
from International Financial Institutions;
•
called upon
the CPA to administer Iraq effectively and create “conditions
in
which the
Iraqi people can freely determine their own political
future”;
•
required
Member States to help the safe return of Iraqi cultural property
(such as
looted
artefacts) and to prevent it being sold;
•
lifted all
sanctions except those related to arms;
•
established
the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), to be controlled by the
CPA,
and gave it
limited immunity (excepting the costs of oil spills);
•
established
new arrangements for the sale of oil, the proceeds of which
would
go into the
DFI, along with any assets of the previous regime held by a
Member
State;
•
extended
OFF by up to six months, by which time the programme should
be
closed
down; and
•
made
provision for a review after 12 months.
399.
The resolution
asked the Secretary-General to appoint a Special
Representative
for Iraq,
with a co-ordinating role focused on reconstruction and
humanitarian support,
reporting
regularly to the UN. Their role in political reconstruction was to
work with
the CPA and
people of Iraq, but not to lead the process. The relevant section
of the
resolution
said that the Security Council:
“Supports
the formation, by the people of Iraq with the help of the Authority
and
working
with the Special Representative, of an Iraqi interim administration
as
a
transitional administration run by Iraqis, until an internationally
recognized,
representative
government is established by the people of Iraq and assumes
the
responsibilities
of the Authority.”
264
Cabinet
Conclusions, 22 May 2003.
265
UN Security
Council resolution 1483 (2003).
202