9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
“II. No one
person or group controls all JAM activity and activities of other
Shia
militias
and individuals are often wrongly attributed to it. The apparently
contradictory
actions of
some JAM members are a result of increasing fractures within
the
movement,
particularly over the use of violence.
“III. Sadr
has to balance his political ambitions with those of his militant
followers.
He could
easily increase levels of violence … though this is unlikely at
present.
He would
have more difficulty reining in violence by his militant followers
against the
MNF … He
remains liable to change tack at short notice.
“IV. In
some areas such as Basra ‘secret cells’ with little loyalty to Sadr
are
responsible
for a significant proportion of the anti‑MNF violence carried out
in the
name of JAM
…
“V. Some
‘secret cells’ are receiving funding, training and supplies from
Lebanese
Hizballah
and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force.
Despite
accepting
Iranian help Sadr remains an Iraqi nationalist: he suspects Iranian
motives
and resents
their influence. The Iranians for their part find Sadr a
frustrating partner.
But Iran
still views Sadr as an important player in the future
Iraq.”
321.
The JIC
assessed that JAM members joined for differing reasons. For some
the
attraction
was the power and prestige that came with bearing arms and
belonging to a
militia.
But in a climate of increasing violence, JAM membership also
offered safety in
numbers and
the likelihood of retribution if attacked. Others joined JAM out of
a sense
of religious
duty; some to attack Sunnis and the MNF, and a small minority used
JAM
as a
cover for solely criminal activity:
“We judge
that this variety of motivating factors is partly responsible for
the divisions
within JAM.
JAM labels such as ‘mainstream’, ‘militant’ and ‘secret cell’ are
a
valuable
analytical aid, but membership is fluid and individuals would not
perceive
themselves
in this way …
“MNF
estimates that there are around 10,000 active supporters with
varying degrees
of
paramilitary training and a further 20,000 sympathisers who could
be mobilised
rapidly …
many members of JAM have joined the Iraqi Security Forces,
particularly
the police.
Tribal loyalties remain important …”
322.
The Iraq Study
Group published its report on 6 December.177
Although it
stressed
that there
was “no magic formula” to guarantee success, it offered 79
recommendations
to improve
US policy in Iraq. In particular, it recommended:
•
changing
the primary mission of US forces in Iraq to one of supporting the
Iraqi
army, to
enable the withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq by the first
quarter
of
2008;
177
Transcript,
6 December 2006, ‘Iraq Study Group Press Conference’.
61