2 |
Decision-making within government
150.
A wider group,
chaired by OD Sec, would be “tasked as necessary by the
inner
group”. The
additional members would include DFID, the Metropolitan Police
Service,
the
Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and media
specialists from
No.10 and
the FCO.
151.
In his advice
to Mr Blair, Sir David Manning adjusted slightly Mr McKane’s
proposal
for a
Ministerial Group. He suggested:
“If we
follow the Afghan precedent, we would set up an Ad Hoc Group
(perhaps
technically
a Sub-Committee of DOP under your chairmanship) to include
Jack
[Straw],
Geoff [Hoon], CDS [Admiral Sir Michael Boyce], C [Sir Richard
Dearlove]
and No.10.
The idea would be to keep it tight with meetings in the Den. If we
move
to military
action, we would, of course, need to widen this to include John
Prescott
[the Deputy
Prime Minister], David Blunkett [the Home Secretary] and
perhaps
others.
“This
leaves the question of what to do about the Attorney. I assume
that
you would
not want him to attend your Ad Hoc Group except by
invitation
on specific occasions.”
152.
Ms Clare
Short, the International Development Secretary, was not on Sir
David’s
list of
recommended participants.
153.
Mr Blair wrote
on Sir David Manning’s advice: “Yes but we can wait before
setting
up a key
Cabinet Group.”93
154.
Mr Jonathan
Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff, instructed Sir David Manning:
“to
progress
official groups and leave Minist[eria]l groups for
now”.94
155.
Asked by the
Inquiry whether having more stress testing by very senior
ministers
not
directly involved with Iraq issues might have helped to highlight
some of the
weaknesses
in areas such as post-conflict planning, Mr Blair
replied:
“… in one
sense I would like to say ‘yes’, because it would be in a way an
easy
enough
concession to make. My frank belief is it would not have made a
great deal
of
difference, no. The committee meetings that we had, small ‘a’,
small ‘h’, ad hoc
meetings, I
think there were 28 of them, 14 of which were minuted. I had the
right
people
there … no-one was saying to me ‘Do it a different way’. I mean, if
someone
had I would
have listened to it, but I have to say to you in addition when I
looked,
for
example, at Mrs Thatcher’s War Cabinet, it didn’t have the
Chancellor of the
Exchequer
on it… you have there the people that you need
there.”95
93
Manuscript
note Blair on Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 12 September 2002,
‘Iraq’.
94
Manuscript
note Powell on Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 12 September 2002,
‘Iraq’.
95
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 26-27.
291