12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
690.
A revised
version of the Strategy was shared with the US on 11
February.624
That
version had removed references to the current security situation
and to Military
Assistance
Teams (MATs) and Police Advisory Teams (PATs). However, on training
the
ISF, it did
state the need to embed “military teams to mentor Iraqi forces in
operational
roles”.
Also added was the need to introduce a criminal justice system,
Iraqi criminal
tribunal
and “improved regimes for detention facilities”.
From
November 2003 to November 2004, the number of US soldiers whose
primary
mission was
to advise Iraqi units grew from 350 to 1,200.625
Gen Luck
advocated doubling
or tripling
the number of advisers partnering Iraqi units and MNSTC‑I expanded
the
programme
in response.
The ‘Iraq:
Strategy for 2005’ paper considered by AHMGI on 9 February 2005
highlighted
that the
idea of Military Assistance Teams (MATs) was supported (as this
followed practice
in
MND(SE)), but did “not favour” Police Advisory Teams
(PATs).626
It stated:
“It is not yet
clear
whether the US will adopt the latter proposal, which carries a high
risk for those
embedded at
local level.”
On MATs,
the paper said that the UK “would not anticipate providing
personnel for Military
Assistance
Teams … outside our current area of operations”.627
On 18
February, Mr Cornish advised Mr Hoon on an MOD review of
the Iraq campaign,
looking at
why the plan “was not delivering the required
results”.628
In
considering the UK’s
involvement
in “campaign enhancement”, Mr Cornish wrote:
“The US has
accepted that the Security Sector Reform (SSR) models which the
UK
are
developing in MND(SE) to train and mentor ISF are likely to be
different from
those that
they might use elsewhere in Iraq.”
Delivering
MATs was listed as one of the possible UK military initiatives. A
footnote
explained:
“The MATs
concept will be implemented using the UK model, which is based
on
developing
partner arrangements between UK and Iraq units, rather than
embedding
individuals
in Iraqi units (the US approach) … Because of Iraqi Ministerial
objections
and force
protection concerns, the PATs concept, as originally conceived
(including
with MNF‑I
embedded in local police stations), is now all but
dead.”
624
Minute
Sheinwald to Hadley, 11 February 2005, ‘Iraq’ attaching ‘Iraq:
Strategy for 2005’.
625
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
626
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 8 February 2005, ‘Iraq: 2005
Strategy’.
627
Paper
Cabinet Office, 7 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Strategy for
2005’.
628
Minute
Cornish to Private Secretary [MOD], 18 February 2005, ‘Iraq – Key
findings of the
Iraq Stocktake’.
207