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13.1  |  Resources
70.  A further minute from Mr Watkins stated that, at their 5 September meeting,
Mr Hoon and Mr Brown had agreed to “meet periodically … so that Mr Hoon could keep
Mr Brown in touch with our emerging thinking on the options for UK involvement in any
military action and the implications for UORs”.60
71.  On 6 September, a Treasury official sent Mr Brown a paper on the global, regional
and local (Iraqi) economic impact of war in Iraq.61 The paper advised that, globally, a
conflict could lead to a rise in the oil price of US$10 a barrel and a consequent reduction
in global growth by 0.5 percentage points and a rise in inflation of between 0.4 and
0.8 percentage points. The paper did not consider the impact of a war on the UK
economy.
72.  The paper also considered Iraq’s post‑war needs. That analysis is described later in
this Section.
73.  The Inquiry has seen no indication that Mr Brown responded to the paper.
74.  On 16 September, a Treasury official produced an analysis for Mr Ed Balls (Special
Adviser to Mr Brown), at Mr Balls’ request, on the implications of military action in Iraq
for UK public spending.62 The official suggested that a “central estimate” of the cost of
“military action” might be £2.5bn, although that could rise considerably if the campaign
was protracted or a large‑scale occupation was required. The official also suggested
that the cost of reconstruction was likely to be in the order of US$9bn, in addition to
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and peacekeeping costs.
75.  The official continued:
“… the wider economic impact of conflict could be very significant … [R]
educed economic growth would hit … revenues … and would feed through to higher
AME forecasts.
“… this year’s Reserve is already heavily overcommitted. There is a very real risk
that we will breach the DEL limit …
“In summary … military action is very likely to constrain our TME [Total Managed
Expenditure] and fiscal flexibility over this and possibly the next financial year.”
76.  The analysis was also sent to the Private Offices of Mr Brown and Mr Paul Boateng,
the Chief Secretary to the Treasury.
60 Minute Watkins to DG RP, 18 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the Chancellor: 23 September’.
61 Email Treasury [junior official] to Bowman, 6 September 2002, ‘What Would be the Economic Impact
of a War in Iraq?’ attaching Paper Treasury, September 2002, ‘What Would be the Economic Impact of
War in Iraq?’.
62 Minute Treasury [junior official] to Balls, 16 September 2002, [untitled].
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