The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
200.
President Bush
telephoned Mr Blair on 15 July.92
In relation to
issues like Iraq,
Mr Blair
told President Bush that it was “absolutely right that the US and
UK should
stand
together”.
201.
Mr Campbell
recorded that President Bush had telephoned to say that
he
understood
Mr Blair “was taking a fair bit of stick for being supportive, and
he was
grateful”.93
That is
confirmed by the record of the telephone call.
202.
At the hearing
of the Liaison Committee on 16 July, Mr Blair was questioned
about
Iraq by Mr
Donald Anderson, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee
(FAC).94
203.
Asked if the
UK’s policy on Iraq had evolved in the same way as the “sea
change”
in US
policy under President Bush, Mr Blair observed that President
Clinton “had also
had a
policy of regime change but how you pursue the policy is another
matter”. It was
“true …
that the issue of Iraq and weapons of mass destruction is on the
agenda in a
different
way”.
204.
Referring to
his statement to Parliament on 14 September 2001 (see Section
3.1),
Mr Blair
said that he believed weapons of mass destruction:
“… posed an
enormous threat to the world. How we deal with that however, is
an
open
question. That is why I say constantly … there are no decisions
which have
been made
in relation to Iraq at all, but there is no doubt that Iraq poses a
threat in
respect of
weapons of mass destruction and there is no doubt that this is an
issue
which
should be dealt with. The one thing we have learnt post-11
September is that
to take
action in respect of a threat that is coming may be more sensible
than to wait
for the
threat to materialise and then take action.”
205.
Asked if the
UK was “preparing for possible military action against Iraq”, Mr
Blair
replied:
“No, there
are no decisions which have been taken about military
action.”95
206.
Asked if the
recent “deployment” of troops from Kosovo and Afghanistan
should
be interpreted
as preparation, Mr Blair replied:
“No … That
is not to say it is not important that we look at all the various
options that
we may have
… and if the situation changes in any serious or dramatic way we
will
92
Letter
Wechsburg to McDonald, 16 July 2002, ‘US: Prime Minister’s
Telephone Conversation with
President
Bush’.
93
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
94
Minutes,
Liaison Committee (House of Commons), 16 July 2002, [Evidence
Session], Q 93.
95
Minutes,
Liaison Committee (House of Commons), 16 July 2002, [Evidence
Session], Q 94.
96
Minutes,
Liaison Committee (House of Commons), 16 July 2002, [Evidence
Session], Q 95.
38