10.4 |
Conclusions: Reconstruction
In August
2010, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) published a review
of the
Government’s
progress in promoting stability in countries emerging from
conflict.
The review
concluded that, between 2005 and 2010, a drive towards
greater
inter‑departmental
co‑operation had led to a number of institutional innovations,
an
increase in
the resources available for stabilisation, new cadres of
practitioners and
improved
co‑ordination in‑country, but that the UK was “not yet delivering
on its full
potential
to engage in fragile states”.43
Issues
highlighted in the review included:
•
a “mismatch”
between ambitions and resources;
•
loyalty to
departments rather than to government as a whole; and
•
lessons
recorded and stored by a number of departments, but seldom
considered
when new
decisions needed to be made.
The
Stabilisation Unit produced a paper on lessons learned from the
UK’s growing
experience
of stabilisation activities in November 2010. Lessons included the
need to
ensure that
economic and development objectives complement and support
efforts
to promote
a peaceful political process, and the importance of securing
community
engagement.
The Inquiry
agrees, in the context of Iraq, with many of the lessons identified
in the RUSI
review and
the November 2010 Stabilisation Unit paper.
148.
From the
available information, it is not possible fully to assess the
impact of the
UK’s
reconstruction effort.
149.
One difficulty
is that the Government never defined what contribution
reconstruction
should make to achieving broader UK objectives and so what
would
constitute
success or failure.
150.
The
environment in Iraq made reconstruction very difficult. For almost
all of the
period
covered by the Inquiry, insecurity was the major constraint. Other
constraints were:
•
the lack of
capacity within the Iraqi Government, both in Baghdad and the
South,
to support
and lead reconstruction;
•
the form
and implementation of de‑Ba’athification;
•
the
politicisation of Iraqi institutions, and corruption;
•
the series
of relatively short‑lived Iraqi administrations between 2004 and
2006
(with
limited remits to initiate reform and an inevitable churn of
Ministers and
senior
officials);
•
an
international community which, because of the circumstances of the
invasion,
was not
fully invested in the reconstruction of Iraq; and
43
Teuten R
& Korski D. Preparing
for Peace. Britain’s Contribution and Capabilities. RUSI,
2010.
551