3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
882.
When
Mr Blair met President Bush on 31 January it was clear that
the
window of
opportunity before the US took military action would be very
short.
The military
campaign could begin “around 10 March”.
883.
President
Bush agreed to support a second resolution to help
Mr Blair.
Mr Blair
confirmed that he was “solidly with the President and ready to
do
whatever it
took to disarm Saddam” Hussein.
884.
The absence
of discussion about planning for the
post‑conflict administration
and
reconstruction of Iraq is addressed in Section 6.5.
885.
Mr Blair
and President Bush had a two‑hour meeting in Washington on
31 January
followed by
a press conference and an informal dinner.288
886.
The meeting
began with a presentation on the threat posed by Abu
Musab
al‑Zarqawi289
and the Al
Qaida poisons network by a US official. Sir Richard
Dearlove
attended
that part of the discussion.
887.
The remainder
of the discussion focused on the issue of a second UN
resolution
and the
timetable of a military campaign.
888.
Following a
discussion of whether a second resolution would help the UK and
the
relationship
between US planning for military action and the diplomatic
strategy, Mr Blair
confirmed
that he was:
“… solidly
with the President and ready do whatever it took to disarm
Saddam.”
889.
Mr Blair
added that he firmly believed that it was essential to tackle the
threats
posed by
WMD and terrorism. He wanted a second resolution if we could
possibly get
one because
it would make it much easier politically to deal with Saddam
Hussein.
He believed
that a second resolution was in reach. A second resolution was
an
insurance
policy against the unexpected.
890.
Mr Blair
set out his position that the key argument in support of a
second
resolution
must rest on the requirement in 1441 that Saddam Hussein must
co‑operate
with the
inspectors. Dr Blix had already said on 27 January that this
was not happening;
he needed
to repeat that message when he reported to the Security Council
in
mid‑February
and at the end of February/early March. That would help to build
the case
for a
second resolution.
288
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with President
Bush on 31
January’.
289 A
prominent member of Al Qaida who was in Baghdad (see
JIC
Assessment, 10 October 2002,
‘International
Terrorism: The Threat from Iraq’).
163