The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
349.
The FCO also
advised that ORHA’s top priority was “restore what is left of
Iraqi
public
administration, so that people can return to work and basic
services can be
delivered
once again”.
350.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke by telephone on 7 May on a broad range
of
foreign
policy issues.196
Mr Blair
commented that ORHA “must grip the nuts and bolts
of reconstruction,
not just focus on politics”.
351.
On 9 May, the
IPU informed Mr Straw’s Private Office that it was now clear
that
negotiations
between the US and UK for an MOU covering ORHA’s operations
were
unlikely to
succeed.197
The
implications for the UK of that situation are addressed
in
Section
9.1.
352.
General Sir
Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), visited Iraq
from
7 to 10
May. He reported his concerns about the pace of reconstruction,
especially in
the South,
to General Sir Michael Walker, Adm Boyce’s successor as CDS, on 13
May:
“Despite
recovering some of the essential public utilities to pre-war
standards,
it is
startlingly apparent that we are not delivering that which was
deemed to be
promised
and is expected … 1 (UK) Armoured Div have formulated a sound
plan
involving
all the lines of operation and effect that are required to create a
viable
state.
However, they have reached the limit of their technical
capabilities and
desperately
need subject matter experts … They have had an embedded
DFID
representative
since initial deployment who has made all the right requests for
some
time, but
no action follows … This situation is compounded by a
comprehensive
stripping
of the public sector infrastructure, an inability to pay public
sector
employees,
a lack of NGO support and planning, and a complete lack of
direction
and
effective action from ORHA.”198
353.
Gen Jackson
concluded:
“We must
release the financial, personnel and infrastructure resources to
effect
a quicker
delivery of reconstruction. If not we will lose the consent we have
so
successfully
achieved.”
354.
The Inquiry
has seen no indication that the report was sent outside the
MOD.
355.
On 11 May,
Mr Sawers reported:
“Four days
in Iraq has been enough to identify the main reasons why
the
reconstruction
of Iraq is so slow. The Coalition are widely welcomed, but
are
gradually
losing public support.
196
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 7 May 2003, ‘US Foreign Policy Issues: Prime
Minister’s Conversation
with Bush,
7 May’.
197
Minute
Chatterton Dickson to FCO [junior official], 9 May 2003, ‘Iraq:
ORHA: MOU’.
198
Minute CGS
to CDS, 13 May 2003, ‘CGS Visit to OP TELIC 7-10 May
2003’.
64