The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
867.
On 23 May,
Mr Asquith met Gen Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to
“talk
through how
we might achieve the ‘political decision’ which the Prime Minister
was
pressing
for”.471
Neither of
his US interlocutors thought this was likely to be
possible:
“… while
they accepted the desirability (and eventual requirement for) a
political
decision,
it was unachievable in the timeframe before September
[when
Gen Petraeus
and Ambassador Crocker were due to report to Congress
on
progress in
Iraq]; chasing it would at best sidetrack effort better put to
achieving the
achievable,
at worst would erect obstacles to the achievement of the
achievable.”
868.
Mr Asquith
commented that this had been:
“A useful,
if deeply depressing, confirmation of the limited ambitions which
the
US has set
itself and the extent to which September has affected the
American
approach to
the agenda. Unless the PM can move Bush … we are in the business
of
managing
the political process between now and September. We can dress this
up
as
reconciliation for public consumption, and doubtless there will be
the occasional
clerical or
‘comprehensive’ conference to pretend something is happening, but I
see
no scope
for tackling the root problem until … September.”
869.
The same day,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary provided him with a draft Note to
send
to
President Bush on reconciliation.472
He
explained that Mr Asquith had already trailed
these ideas
with Ambassador Crocker and Gen Petraeus but without success. There
is
no record
that Mr Blair sent the Note to President Bush.
870.
In his weekly
update of 24 May, Maj Gen Shaw assessed that “the seesaw
struggle
with JAM
continues, with events tipping in their favour this
week”.473
He observed
that
the arrest
of Aws Khafaji, believed to be a senior member of JAM, was likely
to have an
impact on
the level of incoming fire.
871.
On 24 May,
Mr Blair reported to Cabinet on his recent visit to Iraq. He
said
that “there
were some prospects for hope”; some Sunni tribes had started to
reach
accommodations
with US forces and violence had reduced, for example in
Anbar.
But the
question remained whether an accommodation could be reached with
the
Iraqi
government. He attributed continued violence in Basra “almost
entirely” to
Iranian‑backed
Shia cells. Mr Blair concluded that “there was still
undoubtedly a very
872.
Later on 24
May, Mr Blair met ACM Stirrup and senior Whitehall officials
to discuss
Iraq.475
ACM Stirrup
said that the Baghdad Security Plan was “proceeding
reasonably
471
Email
Asquith to McDonald, 23 May 2007, ‘US and
Reconciliation’.
472
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 23 May 2007, ‘Iraq Meeting, 25 May’
attaching Note [Blair to Bush],
‘Iraq –
Reconciliation’.
473
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 24 May 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND (SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 24
May 2007’.
474
Cabinet
Conclusions, 24 May 2007.
475
Letter
Banner to Hickey, 28 May 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting with
Officials’.
162