The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Mr Brown would raise those points with Prime Minister Maliki when he visited Iraq later

in the month.

1019.  NSID(OD) agreed that agreement to the UK’s new Long-Term Strategy for Iraq

would be sought out of committee.

1020.  Following the NSID(OD) meeting, and in advance of Mr Brown’s visit to Iraq, a

DFID official wrote to No.10 detailing four investment proposals, together worth over

US$5bn, which were currently awaiting agreement from the Iraqi Government.598 The

letter did not state why there had been a delay in agreeing the proposals.

1021.  Mr Brown met Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad on 17 December.599 Prime

Minister Maliki repeated his call for a wider long-term relationship, including investment

and economic co-operation, and stronger cultural and educational links. He added

that UK companies should invest in all Iraq, not just Basra. Mr Wareing briefed Prime

Minister Maliki separately on the main investment proposals for Basra and handed over

DFID’s letter detailing the investment proposals awaiting an Iraqi Government response.

1022.  Mr John Tucknott, Deputy Head of Mission British Embassy Baghdad from

November 2007 to July 2009, described the change in the UK’s relationship with Iraq

and the challenge it presented to the UK Government:

“I think Basra remained important … but the messaging that was coming out of

London, which we were conveying to the Iraqis, was that we wanted to move, and

this was the message that Gordon Brown gave to Maliki in December 2008 when

he visited. You know, we are talking about a whole Iraq policy now. We want to do

things with you which we haven’t been able to do before. We want to move on to a

proper footing … a less military footing.

“The problem that we had in the Embassy was persuading some parts of Whitehall,

some Government departments, to recognise that we were moving to this, that we

wanted to increase trade, that it was important that visas were issued to students.

Part of Prime Minister Maliki’s education scheme was to send 10,000 postgraduates

or undergraduates to go to overseas universities to study. We need to provide a

proper visa regime, not the one that we cobbled together.

“So that was a difficulty we faced, actually getting that message out to the wider

Whitehall machinery, that Iraq is moving forwards, and if we want to play an

important role in this process, we had to move with it.

“Messages did get through in the end. We have got a trade and investment section

now … poor old DFID were doing their best in their absence …” 600

598  Letter DFID [junior official] to Fletcher, 12 December 2008, [untitled].

599  Letter Catsaras to Gould, 18 December 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister,

17 December’.

600  Public hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 116 and 117.

362