9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
Status of
Forces Agreements (SOFAs). Sir John outlined four potential risks
to UK
interests
in doing so:
•
Building in
an implicit acceptance of a long-term US presence in Iraq
would
complicate
the rollover of the UN mandate for 2008.
•
UK options
for a military presence post-2008 would be limited and
dependent
on
negotiating a SOFA with the Iraqi Government. If that could not be
achieved
“the
absence of such an agreement could prove to be the basis on which
our
presence in
Iraq is terminated … it would be hard to argue that our decision
was
based on
prevailing security conditions”.
•
The nature
of the international presence in Iraq would change, narrowing
the
coalition
and setting back the efforts the UK had made to “internationalise”
the
effort in
Iraq.
•
UK
arguments that a Chapter VII mandate was required for similar
operations
(for
example, in Darfur) would be weakened.
552.
Sir John
concluded his letter by asking that Mr Miliband be made aware
of these
risks. He
wrote:
“I accept
fully that there are other factors at play. Purely in terms of UN
handling
and
sustaining the UN’s role in Iraq, I would prefer us to keep open
the prospect
of further
renewals of the UN mandate and to stick as far as we can to last
year’s
US‑Iraq
exchange of letters.”
553.
On 31 October,
a government official working closely with the UK military
briefed
the US
military on the negotiations with JAM1 and explored the possibility
of Basrawi
detainees
in US custody being transferred to MND(SE)’s detention facility “to
bolster our
dwindling
numbers in an effort to prolong the detainee release
programme”.261
554.
Around 300
detainees in US custody were thought to be of interest to the UK.
With
the
exception of “A Category insurgents” they could be released when
needed. The
official
noted that there were legal issues to be discussed regarding any
transfer to UK
detention.
US and UK military officers would discuss the
practicalities.
555.
Mr Browne
visited Iraq between 29 October and 2 November.262
In a letter
reporting
his
observations to Mr Brown he described it as “markedly the most
encouraging of my
seven
visits to Basra”. He continued:
“So
progress there has been, but, as you well know, the space we have
achieved
is fragile
and temporary. We have a window of opportunity in Basra and it is
vital
that both
we and the Iraqis apply political and economic leadership to make
the
most of
it.”
261
Email
government official working closely with the military, 3 November
2007, ‘Visit to Camp Bucca
31 October
2007’.
262
Letter
Browne to Brown, 2 November 2007, [untitled].
285