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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
531.  A funding bid for £5.53m for a project to support the prison service in Southern Iraq
from summer 2004 onwards stated that prisons strategy in MND(SE) was overseen by
the Director of Law and Order, who had been seconded from the UK Prison Service.479
He was supported by a Senior Prisons Adviser and an administrator. Prison monitoring
was undertaken by three members of the Military Prison Service plus two members of
the Territorial Army who were UK prison officers in their civilian careers. The bid sought
to increase staffing numbers to 15. All other staff working in the Correctional Service
were Iraqi locals.
532.  The bid stated that there were approximately 800 prisoners in MND(SE). Three
new prisons were in development, with a total capacity of 1,650 places. All prisons within
the CPA(South) boundary run by the Iraqi Prison Service were overseen and maintained
by the UK.
533.  A letter dated 2 July confirmed that £1.7m had been agreed for that project by the
Iraqi GCPP Strategy Committee.480
The position in the South leading up to the transfer of sovereignty
534.  A record of the Iraq Senior Officials Group on 12 December 2003 stated that the
MOD intended to deploy an additional infantry battalion to assist ICDC training and more
RMP to assist police training and mentoring.481 The record stated: “The importance of
close co‑ordination between departments on police initiatives was stressed”.
535.  On 19 December, Mr Lee wrote to Mr Bowen, stating there had been “some
surprise” expressed at the forthcoming deployment of additional RMP to MND(SE) and
“concern about MOD’s alleged lack of consultation over this deployment”.482
536.  Mr Lee wrote:
“For months now the MOD has been assured by the FCO, and MND(SE) has been
assured by the CPA, that civil police were in the pipeline to provide training and
mentoring … All accepted the crucial importance of standing up the IPS as rapidly
as possible and thus the importance of providing proper civil police trainers to train
civil police. HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] and the CPA have not … delivered …
we have repeatedly stressed that we see police training as important and that it is
best delivered by civil police.”
479  Paper Global Conflict Prevention Pool Project Bid Form, [undated, early 2004], ‘Prison Service Support
in Southern Iraq’.
480  Letter Carlin to Hayward, 2 July 2004, ‘Iraq Global Conflict Prevention Pool’.
481  Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 15 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials Group
[12 December]’.
482  Letter Lee to Bowen, 19 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Police Support for MND(SE)’.
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