6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

90. The Cabinet Office paper did not make any recommendations but analysed two

broad options: toughening the existing containment policy, and regime change by

military means. The points made in the paper included:

• An improved containment policy would make a sanctions regime more attractive

and reduce Iraq’s illicit revenues. The return of the inspectors would also allow

greater scrutiny of Iraq’s WMD programme and security forces.

• Some of the difficulties with the existing policy would, however, still apply and

the US had lost confidence in containment.

• The only certain means to remove Saddam Hussein and his elite was to invade

and impose a new government. That would be a new departure which would

require the construction of a coalition and a legal justification.

• Internal regime change in Iraq was likely to result in government by another

Sunni military strongman.

• If the US and others committed to nation‑building for many years,

“a representative broadly democratic government” was possible but the

paper concluded it would be Sunni‑led.

• The use of overriding force in a ground campaign was the only option to offer

confidence that Saddam Hussein would be removed and bring Iraq back into

the international community.

• No legal justification for an invasion currently existed.

• A staged approach, establishing international support, should be considered.

91. Dr Cholerton sent a copy of the Cabinet Office and FCO papers to Mr Hoon on

8 March.38

92. Dr Cholerton advised that the text had not been agreed by the MOD and that,

at the request of the Cabinet Office, the paper had not been circulated within the

MOD. Copies of the minute and papers were sent only to Adm Boyce, Sir Kevin Tebbit,

Mr Webb and Mr Desmond Bowen, MOD Director General Operational Policy.

93. Mr Hoon asked for further advice on the US legal justification for both a military

attack on Iraq and regime change in Iraq, and how practicable action was against states

breaking sanctions.39

94. Dr Cholerton’s response of 26 March:

• set out the MOD’s understanding of the UK and US legal position; and

• the difficulties of controlling trade between Iraq and its neighbours and other

countries in the region.40

38 Minute Cholerton to APS/SofS [MOD], 8 March 2002, ‘Iraq: OD Secretariat Options Paper’.

39 Minute Williams to Cholerton, 12 March 2002, ‘Iraq: OD Secretariat Options Paper’.

40 Minute Cholerton to APS/SofS [MOD], 26 March 2002, ‘Iraq: OD Secretariat Options Paper’.

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