The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
522.
Mr Straw
described the benefits of an early announcement on a security
strategy
as being “a
sense of direction for the Iraqi people; and the beginning of a
plan for
draw‑down
for coalition partners”.
523.
On the
political process, Mr Straw reported that messages to Iraqi
contacts
had
emphasised “the importance of getting good people into the key
security related
Ministerial
positions (Defence and Interior)” and of the “enormous damage that
could
be done
to efforts at outreach by a significant renewal of the
de-Ba’athification drive”.
524.
On
international engagement, Mr Straw wrote that the objectives of a
conference
would be
“ensuring an inclusive approach to build a wide base of support for
the Iraqi
political
process; and a reformed approach to donor co-ordination”. The scope
for
bringing
other international partners into key activities in Iraq was also
being considered.
525.
In the last
week of March, the US and UK Governments were encouraging the
Iraqi
parties to
conclude negotiations to form a new Government.289
526.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald told Mr Hadley that the UK was increasingly frustrated
with the
stalemate
and concerned about its consequences.290
527.
Lieutenant
General Robin Brims, who had commanded 1 (UK) Armoured
Division
during the
invasion of Iraq in 2003, succeeded Lt Gen Kiszely as SBMR-I in
April 2005.
528.
On 6 April,
the JIC assessed the state of the insurgency in Iraq after the
January
529.
The JIC judged
that:
“A
significant Sunni insurgency will continue through 2005 and beyond,
but the
opportunities
for reducing it appear greater than we judged in early
February.”
530.
The JIC
confirmed its earlier assessment that “there is no unified
Sunni
insurgency”.
Although a high level of violence remained, the atmosphere created
by the
January
election had encouraged some opposition groups, including some
insurgents,
to rethink
their strategy. The actions of the ITG would be critical in
changing Sunni
perceptions.
If it failed to respond effectively to Sunni concerns it would play
into the
hands of
the insurgents and deepen the violence. But if the political
process gained
momentum,
Sunni support for the insurgency would diminish.
531.
The JIC
reported that the week of the Iraqi elections had seen more than
1,000
recorded
attacks by insurgents, one of the highest weekly totals since the
invasion.
289
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 23 March 2005, ‘Conversation with National
Security Adviser,
23 March
2005’.
290
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 1 April 2005, ‘Nigel Sheinwald’s phone call with
Steve Hadley, 31 March’.
291
JIC
Assessment, 6 April 2005, ‘Iraq: The State of the
Insurgency’.
478