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1.1  |  UK Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
UNSCOM’s view was that, “were it to have full access to all relevant sites and
persons in Iraq”, it was “highly likely that proscribed items would be discovered”;
and that “Iraq’s actions to impede or block the Commission’s concealment
investigations” tended to “affirm this view”.
Iraq had “increasingly failed to apply or behave in conformity with the modalities
[agreed on 22 June]” and, “in more recent times”, had “sought both to exclude
them altogether with respect to certain sites and to define new categories of often
very large sites from which the Commission inspectors would be forbidden”.
336.  The report concluded that UNSCOM was “convinced” that:
The Security Council should “insist that Iraq meet its obligation to disclose fully
all of its prohibited weapons and associated programmes”. This was a “crucial
requirement” for which there was “no substitute”.
It was “essential” for the Council to “reaffirm and demand Iraq’s complete
co‑operation” with UNSCOM’s exercise of “its rights to full access to sites
and persons”.
337.  In a letter on 12 October, Mr Aziz set out Iraq’s concerns about UNSCOM activities
and the influence of the US and UK on UNSCOM’s approach, including:
The US “in particular, together with Britain, were doing their utmost … to topple
the national Government of Iraq and to eliminate its national leadership”. That
“seriously affected the composition” of UNSCOM, with the US “leading the
hostile work against Iraq”. An activity which was “supposed to be international
and neutral” was “unbalanced”.
The US monopolised the intelligence means. Iraq wanted aerial surveillance
using a plane from a neutral state.
The justification for intrusive inspections was based on allegations of deliberate
concealment and inaccurate information which were themselves inaccurate and
being deliberately used by UNSCOM to procrastinate and to prolong the inspections
process. For example, the delay in analysing missile fragments had been caused
by UNSCOM’s original insistence that the analysis should be conducted in the US.
The reports submitted to the Council were “tendentious”, using a method that
was “intended to confuse the past with what has been newly achieved, in a
manner that makes it difficult for the reader to differentiate between the positive
and negative aspects”; and that many of the reports were “inaccurate”. The
Security Council and international community “were being deliberately misled
with a view to fostering baseless suspicions about Iraq’s capabilities”.
Iraq had not been asked in 1992 to preserve the remnants of the special
warheads it had destroyed, and the subject had been “considered as closed” in
UNSCOM’s report in June 1995. In the absence of any missiles or means for
their delivery, the warheads had no operational value. The renewed focus on
special warheads was deliberately aimed at delay.
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