11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
the
de‑Ba’athification Law and abolish its enforcement mechanism, the
Supreme
de‑Ba’athification
C [sic] Commission”.179
The British
and US Embassies in Baghdad
were
reported to be “working up … a gameplan” and Mr Straw would
take Prime Minister
Ja’afari
through the arguments.
221.
On 21
November, Mr Asquith commented on a research paper on Iraq by
an
external
organisation.180
He
wrote:
“Tackling
de‑Ba’athification is very important, but I’m not sure that just
changing
the level
of the bar is sufficient: those inside Iraq are more interested in
making
a
distinction between those who can be prosecuted for criminal acts,
not merely
membership
in or association with the Ba’ath party. Key in all this will be a
credible
and
independent body to adjudicate.”
222.
On 27
November, Mr Doug Wilson, an official in the British Embassy
Baghdad
sent a
report to Mr Patey of a briefing by the Independent Electoral
Commission of
Iraq’s
(IECI) International Commissioner, Mr Craig
Jenness.181
Mr Wilson
wrote that the
IECI had
sent the names of around 7,000 electoral candidates to the
de‑Ba’athification
Commission
for checking. Having considered 70 percent of those names,
the
Commission
had recommended that 67 individuals be disqualified, including
some
senior
politicians. Mr Wilson proposed that the US and UK should
lobby Dr Chalabi.
223.
A message from
the British Embassy Baghdad to the FCO on 29 November
stated
that the UK
and US had encouraged the IECI “to adopt a process which allows
them to
reject the
rulings of the de‑Ba’athification Commission and retain most of the
names on
the
electoral lists”.182
Mr Patey
had lobbied senior members of the TNA to allow those
recommended
for disqualification to run and commented that “with the US, we
will
co‑ordinate
an approach to seek the Commission to reverse its
decisions”.
224.
Mr Patey
called on Dr Chalabi on 30 November to convey concerns about
the
involvement
of the de‑Ba’athification Commission in vetting electoral
candidates, which
he
explained was likely to be seen as political
interference.183
He
suggested that there
should
instead be “due judicial process” for those identified, whose names
ought to stay
on the
electoral lists until their appeal had been dealt
with.
225.
In response,
Dr Chalabi reminded Mr Patey that the Commission had
no
authority
to ban any candidate. Its remit was to identify those covered by
the
179
Paper IPU,
10 November 2005, ‘Sunni Arab Outreach: Update as of 10 November
2005’.
180
Email
Asquith to Hilder, 21 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Org
Draft’.
181
Email
Wilson to Patey, 27 November 2005, ‘Elections:
de‑Ba’athification’.
182
eGram
19506/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 29 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Elections:
de‑Ba’athification
Affects
Candidates’.
183
eGram
19906/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 5 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Elections:
de‑Ba’athification of
Candidates:
Update’.
43