4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
332.
A separate
email from the same DIS official stated that a member of his
team
would “not
give the idea of an IND time of day” and assessed there were only
two
scenarios
to consider:
“(a) If
Saddam still thinks he has time on his side, he will try to develop
a nuclear
weapon …
Iraq won’t succeed while sanctions are in place, and will take at
least
five years
once sanctions are removed …
“(b) In the
last resort – when his regime and he are about to fall with the US
infantry
on the
doorstep, he will use what ever he can do rapidly – eg
indiscriminate
spreading
of CB agents and toxic chemical … One point which I believe
everyone
has missed
in the ridiculous debate on INDs is that there will be one obvious
last
ditch
action that Saddam will take in the spirit of torching the
oilfields as he retreated
in 1991 …
demolish the store of natural and low-enriched yellowcake … in
the
southern
outskirts of Baghdad .. There is no risk of a nuclear blast …
However …
Saddam
would want to play on the irrational fears in Western opinion as he
heads
for a safe
haven. He would, of course, blame … the US …”157
333.
The DIS
official also provided draft language explaining how difficult
nuclear
weapons
were to make.
334.
At the JIC on
11 September, Mr Scarlett explained that his “purpose in
circulating
the draft,
and in tabling it for discussion, was to invite comments on its
content.
In particular
on the question of whether or how best to describe or present the
work the
JIC had
done in the last several years to assess Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction
capabilities
and intentions.”158
335.
The minutes
record that the main points which were made were:
“a. the
part of the draft that looked at what was known or assessed
from
intelligence was
at the heart of the dossier with the potential to have a
significant
impact. It
needed to be as factual as possible, and to convey accurately
but
dramatically
the rising concern about Iraq’s weapons programmes. It
needed
in particular
to emphasise the importance of recent intelligence in shedding
light
on the
progress Iraq had made since 1998, and on Saddam Hussein’s
readiness
to deploy
and use these weapons;
b. it made
good sense both to describe the way that the JIC and the
central
intelligence
machinery had kept Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
programme
under
regular review, and to outline in the main body of the text what
the
Committee’s
key judgements or messages to Ministers and policy makers
since
1998 had
been. The Committee’s authority would lend important weight
to
the
dossier’s content and enhance its impact. But on balance, to avoid
setting
157
Email
[1132] DIS [junior official] to DIS [junior official], 11 September
2002, ‘Questions from
[Assessments
Staff junior official]’.
158
Minutes, 11
September 2002, JIC meeting.
177