The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“I am in no
doubt that the threat is serious, and current; and that he has
made
progress on
WMD and that he has to be stopped.”
515.
The draft
concluded:
“The case I
make is not that Saddam could launch a nuclear attack on London
or
another
part of the UK (He could not). The case I make is that the UN
resolution[s]
demanding
he stops his WMD programme are being flouted; that since
the
inspectors
left four years ago, he has continued with this programme; and
the
inspectors
must be allowed in to do their job properly.
“It is the
minimum necessary to ensure that he does not get to use the
weapons
he has,
or get hold of the weapons he wants.”
516.
A draft was
sent to Mr Powell and Sir David Manning on 17 September,
asking
for comments
as soon as possible before it was shown to Mr Blair or
Mr Scarlett.258
517.
Mr Powell
offered three comments on the Foreword:
•
“I think it
is worth explicitly stating, as TB keeps saying, this is the advice
to
him from
the JIC. On the basis of this advice what other action could he
as
PM take. Something
like ‘I am today taking the exceptional step of
publishing
the JIC’s
advice to me because I want MPs and the British public to see
the
advice on
which I am acting. When you have read this I ask you to
consider
what else a
responsible PM could do than follow the course we have in
the
face of
the advice?’”
•
“We need to
do more to back up the assertions. We cannot of course
publish
the detailed
raw intelligence on which this report is based without
endangering
the lives
of agents. But all the statements in this report are backed up by
detailed
intelligence
reports, the veracity and sources of which have been verified
by
the intelligence
agencies. Is there any independent verification we can
cite?”
•
“In the
penultimate para you need to make it clear Saddam could not
attack
us at
the moment. The thesis is he would be a threat to the UK in the
future
if we do
not check him.”259
518.
When
Mr Campbell sent his and Mr Blair’s comments on the draft
dossier
to
Mr Scarlett on 17 September, he also asked Mr Scarlett
for his views on the
258
Email
Blackshaw to Manning, 17 September 2002, ‘Iraq Dossier Foreword’.
The draft was replaced 20
minutes
later by a slightly amended version circulated with – Email
Hatfield to Powell, 17 September 2002,
‘Revised
Dossier Foreword’.
259
Email
Powell to Campbell and Manning, 17 September 2002, ‘Re: Revised
Dossier Foreword’.
260
Minute
Campbell to Scarlett, 17 September 2002, [untitled].
210