The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
338.
Mr David
Richmond, the Prime Minister’s Acting Special Representative on
Iraq,182
reported to
the FCO:
“The
immediate cause of the disturbances is clear. Supplies of petrol
and diesel
in Basra’s
service stations ran out on 9 August … This was combined with
a
major
blackout in Basra … There is no doubt that political elements …
exploited
the
situation. There is also evidence of pre-planning … but without the
fuel and
electricity
crisis, agitators would not have found much
purchase.”183
339.
Section 10.1
describes the UK’s response, including the development of
the
US$127m
Essential Services Plan, which aimed to improve fuel, power and
water
infrastructure
in Basra, and the redeployment of UK troops to secure fuel
facilities.
340.
Mr Adams
deployed to Iraq in mid-September.184
In early
September, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) prepared a
draft Order
expressing
the intent to establish an “Iraq Heritage Trust” (IHT), to hold
Iraq’s oil and gas
export
revenues.185
The UK
Government assessed that the draft Order clearly
provided
for the IHT
to continue to operate after the CPA had transferred power to a
sovereign
Iraqi Government.
The UK
Government argued that the decision on whether to operate an oil
trust fund
should be
left to a future Iraqi Government. The priority was to rebuild
capacity and embed
best
practice in the Iraqi Ministries of Finance and Oil; the CPA was
working to establish
transparency
and good governance in the oil sector, with “strong UK
input”.
The
proposal was “put on hold” after opposition from Washington and
London and within
the
CPA.
341.
From October,
the DTI adopted a new approach to pursuing UK objectives in
the
oil sector,
focused on engaging directly with Iraqi interlocutors rather than
with the CPA.
342.
Ms Joan
MacNaughton, DTI Director General, Energy, wrote to Mr Bowen
on
3 October,
seeking a discussion on a new framework to guide the DTI’s
engagement
343.
Ms MacNaughton
advised that communication with the US and CPA on oil
issues
remained
difficult. Meanwhile, the DTI was receiving increasing numbers of
requests for
182
Mr Richmond
was the Acting Special Representative from July to September 2003,
when Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
arrived in Iraq to take up that post. Mr Richmond became the Deputy
Special Representative.
183
Telegram
114 IraqRep to FCO London, 12 August 2003, ‘Situation in
Basra’.
184
Minute
Adams to Briggs, 15 September 2003, [untitled].
185
Email
Treasury [junior official] to Lindsey, 23 January 2004, ‘Iraq: John
Snow and Oil Trust Funds’
attaching
Paper Treasury, [undated], ‘Iraq Oil Trust Fund’.
186
Letter
MacNaughton to Bowen, 3 October 2003, ‘UK Engagement on Iraqi Oil
Issues’.
424