The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“When
viewed with a broader lens, the Iraqi decision to combat these
groups in
Basra has
major significance. First, a Shia majority government, led by
Prime
Minister
Maliki, has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals
and
extremists
regardless of sectarian identity. Second, Iraqi Security Forces led
these
operations,
in Basra, and in towns and cities throughout the South. British
and
US elements
played important roles, but these were supporting roles, as
they
should be.”
991.
Reporting on
10 April, Maj Gen White-Spunner said that the ISF had
reasonable
freedom of
movement on Basra’s main routes and in the centre and east but less
so in
the north
and west where effective IED attacks against their patrols
continued and small
arms fire
incidents were commonplace.487
The militia
strongholds of Qibla, Hayaniyah
and Five
Mile Market remained under JAM control. The city was increasingly
tense, with
people
anticipating the second phase of ISF operations.
992.
The weapons
amnesty had ended on 8 April, but a lack of publicity meant that
it
had had
limited success. The ISF planned to launch a series of clearance
operations
to find and
confiscate medium to heavy weapons in key areas, although this
phase of
operations
had been delayed twice.
993.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner concluded:
“We
continue to believe that the events of the past two weeks, although
unexpected
and open to
misinterpretation, are a real opportunity for Basra and hence
our
involvement
here. The time for any recrimination over lack of Iraqi
consultation and
rumours of
possible complicity by others in Baghdad is behind us; we now have
a
better
chance than we have arguably had for two years to achieve better
security
and some
initial development goals in the city. We will not have long to do
so, given
that the
run up to the October elections will inevitably lead to
polarisation and a
possible
recurrence of factional violence. The next two-three months are
therefore
critical
and if the next phase of the ISF security operation is successful
then we must
be prepared
to exploit that success more quickly.”
994.
On 11 April,
Dr Christian Turner, Deputy Director Middle East, North
Africa
and North
America in the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence
Secretariat,
advised
Mr Brown that he should use his forthcoming visit to
Washington to press
President Bush
for UK involvement in planning for Basra.488
He
explained:
“At present
we have little insight into their [US] thinking, and its effect on
us. A key
deliverable
for your meeting with [President] Bush is to secure our involvement
in
planning:
if we are to stay in the South, we need agreed plans …
487
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 10 April 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) weekly letter –
10 April 2008’.
488
Minute
Turner to Prime Minister, 11 April 2008, ‘Iraq: Implications of
Basra Operation and US Visit’.
366