The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
92.
A JIC
Assessment of 15 December assessed that a credible ISF, capable
of
managing
the insurgency unaided, would not emerge until 2006 at the
earliest.
93.
The JIC
Assessment was discussed at the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
the
following
day. Ministers agreed that a number of papers should be prepared,
including
practical
suggestions to adjust the Petraeus Plan53
for SSR,
ways of improving the Iraqi
Ministry of
Defence and MOI, a list of security and funding issues for
Mr Blair to raise
with
President Bush and a list of useful activities that other countries
could be asked to
undertake.
The lack of a policing strategy for Iraq, which had been identified
by the IPU
as early as
July 2003, had still not been addressed.
94.
In February
2005, the FCO produced a paper for the AHMGIR that
contained
proposals
for a greater focus at the national level where there was “an
urgent need
for an
Iraqi national policing strategy, supported by an appropriate
training syllabus
to address
established weaknesses”.54
The
proposals were for the development of a
National
Police Plan and in the areas of forensics and intelligence. The FCO
paper also
pointed to
potential funding pressures if those new proposals were to be
adopted and if
current
projects were extended.
95.
The FCO told
the AHMGIR that the key message from the paper was that
funding
beyond
September was extremely tight and tough decisions would need to be
made.
96.
In the absence
of an SSR strategy against which the merits and contribution of
any
particular
project or programme could be judged, the basis on which such
decisions
could be
made was unclear.
97.
Just three
months after the JIC had raised concerns about the development of
the
ISF, the
MOD advised No.10 in March that the Petraeus Plan was “largely on
track,
meeting the
demands of a well‑entrenched counter insurgency”.55
The ISF was
expected
to achieve
full strength by January 2006 and the transfer of regional control
would be
under way.
The view from No.10 was that the MOD’s advice was “rather
insubstantial,
and almost
certainly too optimistic in its assessment of the quality of much
of the ISF”.56
98.
The MOD’s
assessment was also contrary to other reports coming from Iraq
around
that time
and it became difficult for Ministers to know which evidence was
most accurate.
In his
Hauldown Report, Lieutenant General John Kiszely, Senior British
Military
Representative,
Iraq (SBMR‑I) from October 2004 to April 2005, described the MOI
as
dysfunctional
and stated that any expectation that the IPS would be able to
perform well
against the
insurgency was unrealistic.
53
The
Petraeus Plan followed a ‘Troops to Task’ assessment carried out by
Lt Gen Petraeus in the
summer of
2004. The resulting plan was to increase the Iraqi Police Service
and Iraqi National Guard
by roughly
50 percent.
54
Note FCO,
21 February 2005, ‘Iraq – UK Support to Civil Policing in Iraq –
2005’.
55
Letter
Naworynsky to Quarrey, 17 March 2005, ‘Petraeus Plan
Update’.
56
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 18 March 2005, ‘Iraq
Update’.
432