Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
92.  A JIC Assessment of 15 December assessed that a credible ISF, capable of
managing the insurgency unaided, would not emerge until 2006 at the earliest.
93.  The JIC Assessment was discussed at the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq the
following day. Ministers agreed that a number of papers should be prepared, including
practical suggestions to adjust the Petraeus Plan53 for SSR, ways of improving the Iraqi
Ministry of Defence and MOI, a list of security and funding issues for Mr Blair to raise
with President Bush and a list of useful activities that other countries could be asked to
undertake. The lack of a policing strategy for Iraq, which had been identified by the IPU
as early as July 2003, had still not been addressed.
94.  In February 2005, the FCO produced a paper for the AHMGIR that contained
proposals for a greater focus at the national level where there was “an urgent need
for an Iraqi national policing strategy, supported by an appropriate training syllabus
to address established weaknesses”.54 The proposals were for the development of a
National Police Plan and in the areas of forensics and intelligence. The FCO paper also
pointed to potential funding pressures if those new proposals were to be adopted and if
current projects were extended.
95.  The FCO told the AHMGIR that the key message from the paper was that funding
beyond September was extremely tight and tough decisions would need to be made.
96.  In the absence of an SSR strategy against which the merits and contribution of any
particular project or programme could be judged, the basis on which such decisions
could be made was unclear.
97.  Just three months after the JIC had raised concerns about the development of the
ISF, the MOD advised No.10 in March that the Petraeus Plan was “largely on track,
meeting the demands of a well‑entrenched counter insurgency”.55 The ISF was expected
to achieve full strength by January 2006 and the transfer of regional control would be
under way. The view from No.10 was that the MOD’s advice was “rather insubstantial,
and almost certainly too optimistic in its assessment of the quality of much of the ISF”.56
98.  The MOD’s assessment was also contrary to other reports coming from Iraq around
that time and it became difficult for Ministers to know which evidence was most accurate.
In his Hauldown Report, Lieutenant General John Kiszely, Senior British Military
Representative, Iraq (SBMR‑I) from October 2004 to April 2005, described the MOI as
dysfunctional and stated that any expectation that the IPS would be able to perform well
against the insurgency was unrealistic.
53 The Petraeus Plan followed a ‘Troops to Task’ assessment carried out by Lt Gen Petraeus in the
summer of 2004. The resulting plan was to increase the Iraqi Police Service and Iraqi National Guard
by roughly 50 percent.
54 Note FCO, 21 February 2005, ‘Iraq – UK Support to Civil Policing in Iraq – 2005’.
55 Letter Naworynsky to Quarrey, 17 March 2005, ‘Petraeus Plan Update’.
56 Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 18 March 2005, ‘Iraq Update’.
432
Previous page | Contents | Next page