The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
158.
Lord
Goldsmith’s view was that:
“… a
further Security Council resolution is needed to authorise imposing
reform
and
restructuring of Iraq and its Government. In the absence of a
further resolution,
the UK (and
US) would be bound by the provisions of international law
governing
belligerent
Occupation … the general principle is that an Occupying Power does
not
become the
government of the occupied territory. Rather, it exercises
temporary de
facto
control …”
159.
The principles
of international law as they applied to the UK and US as
Occupying
Powers in
Iraq before and after the adoption of resolution 1483 on 22 May
2003 are
summarised
in the Box ‘The legal framework for Occupation’ later in this
Section.
160.
Those
principles are addressed in more detail in Section
9.1.
161.
Section 9.1
also addresses UK efforts to agree with the US a Memorandum
of
Understanding
(MOU) on a set of principles governing activity in post-conflict
Iraq.
162.
In advance of
the meeting between Mr Blair and President Bush at Camp David
on
26 and 27
March, Mr Straw’s Private Office sent Mr Matthew Rycroft,
Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, a negotiating brief for what was to become
resolution 1483,
the
resolution defining the roles of the UN and the Coalition in
post-conflict Iraq.98
163.
The
negotiating brief, prepared by the IPU, described what was
known
about what
would happen during the “first few weeks” after the combat phase of
the
military
campaign:
“Immediately
after the conflict, the Coalition will be in control of
Iraq.
“As soon as
it is safe to do so, [Lieutenant General (retired)] Jay Garner [the
Head
of ORHA]
and his Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA)
will arrive
behind the military and become a transitional administration. Their
aim will
be to work
with the existing Iraqi public administration, so far as possible.
Garner
will then
take forward the reconstruction process. His people will be
inserted into the
top of the
Iraqi ministries, with senior US officials being assigned to each
ministry as
‘shadow
ministers’ …
“ORHA is
understaffed and begun preparing for its task only a few weeks
ago.
There are
now some ten or so UK secondees embedded in it. Garner would
like
to be out
of Iraq within 90-120 days. Whether ORHA will be able to get any
reform
programme
started in that time is moot. This period is likely to be dominated
by
humanitarian
and security concerns.”
98
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 25 March 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington:
Iraq: UN Security Council
Resolution
on Phase IV’ attaching Paper Iraq Planning Unit, 25 March 2003,
‘Iraq: Phase IV: Authorising
UNSCR’.
30