6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
1398.
Despite
concerns about the implications of de-Ba’athification, by 28 March
there
was no
agreement with the US on the issue.614
1399.
During 2002
and early 2003, UK analysts described Iraq as:
•
“potentially
fundamentally unstable”; and
•
facing “a
risk of a wider breakdown as the regime’s authority
crumbles”.
1400.
Mr Blair
insisted that the Coalition must prevent anarchy and
internecine
fighting
breaking out.
1401.
He told
President Bush that Iraq would be at risk of internecine
fighting
when a
military strike destabilised the regime.
1402.
On 13 June
2002, the SPG described Iraq as “potentially
fundamentally
unstable”.615
Iraq was
held together by a strong security apparatus. It would
require
considerable
force to break the security structure, but when that happened the
regime
would
“shatter”. Among the military tasks for the first six months would
be the provision
of external
and internal security, and law and order, “to prevent any potential
for
inter‑ethnic
violence”.
1403.
On 15 January
2003, Mr Blair told the Chiefs of Staff “the ‘Issue’ was
aftermath –
the
Coalition must prevent anarchy and internecine fighting breaking
out”.616
He
asked
the MOD to
look at the big “what ifs”, including internecine fighting, and to
develop a
strategy.
1404.
The annotated
agenda for the second round of talks on post-conflict issues
on
22 January
stated that establishing a secure environment would be an urgent
task and:
“We shall
also want to prevent internecine violence. Our handling of the
defeated Iraqi
forces will
be critical.”
1405.
Mr Blair’s
Note to President Bush on 24 January stated that the biggest risk
they
faced was
internecine fighting in Iraq when a military strike destabilised
the regime.617
1406.
The JIC
Assessment of 19 February stated that there were “large
numbers
of armed
groups and some potential for tribal score-settling” and “a risk of
a wider
breakdown
as the regime’s authority crumbles”.618
But there
were “no indications … of
Shia
preparations for an all-out civil war against Sunni
Iraqis”.
1407.
MOD advice for
Mr Hoon before Mr Blair’s 6 March meeting on
post-conflict
issues
stated that much of the UK preparation for post-conflict Iraq was
based on
614
Minute
Drummond to Bowen, 28 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction
Agenda’.
615
Minute
Driver to PSO/CDS, 13 June 2002, ‘Supporting Paper for COS
Strategic Think Tank on Iraq –
18 June’
attaching Paper [unattributed], 12 June 2002,
[untitled].
616
Minute
MA/DCJO to MA/CJO, 15 January 2003, ‘Briefing to Prime
Minister’.
617
Letter
Manning to Rice, 24 January 2003, [untitled] attaching
‘Note’.
618
JIC
Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq: What’s in
Store?’
557