3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
resolutions]
and surviving; or failing to comply and his regime ending up being
changed
as a
consequence of the international community enforcing
compliance.”
33.
Secretary
Powell told Mr Straw that the US was looking for a serious
response from
Iraq to a
required declaration. If it was not serious, “Saddam would clearly
be playing
games and
that should be considered a casus belli”. The US wanted something
which
it could
measure, and “to assess Iraqi seriousness before they got rolling
on inspectors”.
In his
view, Mr Blair and President Bush “needed to talk about the
role of a declaration:
there was
still some uncertainty in the Administration about what the UK
wanted/could
live
with”.
34.
Mr Straw
replied he “feared” a declaration “could be a trap for us, not
Saddam”,
and “a real
chance that Saddam would deliver a Rolls Royce reply in order to
‘scatter
his
enemies’ … [A] full, final and complete declaration could only be
done with the
inspectors.”
A declaration could be folded into the process in a different way.
The US and
UK should
focus on the return of the inspectors and ask for a declaration
after practical
arrangements
had been agreed but before the inspectors arrived.
35.
Asked what
would happen if the declaration was inadequate, Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
stated that
the Security Council could say the “inspectors would check the
points over
which there
was disagreement”.
36.
Secretary
Powell said that “his hunch” was that Iraq would be
forthcoming:
“They would
send something which matched what we knew. In that case we
could
say we had
a ‘serious basis’ for inspectors … If, on the other hand, the
Iraqis gave
something
thin, there would be no point sending inspectors …”
37.
Mr Straw
thought that Iraq would calibrate its response to satisfy France
and
Russia: “We
preferred the test to rely less on subjective judgement”.
Mr Blair had “been
consistent
in giving prominence to the importance of inspections since the
Crawford
meeting in
April. A declaration would be a diversion from our long‑standing
position.”
38.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell agreed that there were “no real differences”
between
the US and
UK on the conditions for the inspectors’ return and the modalities
for their
operations.
39.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock asked “how fierce the US wanted to be over ‘all
necessary
means’”.
Sir David Manning’s conversations with Dr Rice seemed to
indicate this was
“not an
absolute requirement” for President Bush. The US should talk to
Russia before
putting it
to the Security Council. If the US and UK tried and failed to get
Security
Council
agreement to inclusion of the phrase, “we would be further back
than if we had
not
tried at all”.
40.
Secretary
Powell assessed that Mr Vladimir Putin, the Russian President,
“wanted
to be on
this train” and we could get him “to sign up to most anything”. He
reminded
Mr Straw
that “the US was going to deliver the French”.
207