The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
31.
Mr Feith
recorded that a draft de‑Ba’athification policy had been considered
by
the US
National Security Council on 10 March. At Ambassador Bremer’s
request,
implementation
of the policy, which would “rid the Iraqi Government of the small
group of
true
believers at the top of the party and those who had committed
crimes in its name”,
was delayed
until his arrival in Iraq.20
32.
Ambassador
Bremer wrote:
“Our
concern was only the top four levels of the party membership, which
the [draft]
order
officially excluded from public life. These were the Ba’athist
loyalists who,
by virtue
of their positions of power in the regime, had been active
instruments of
Saddam’s
repression. Our intelligence community estimated that they
amounted
to only
about 1 percent of all party members or approximately 20,000
people,
overwhelmingly
Sunni Arabs.”
33.
Four days
after arriving in Iraq, Mr Sawers reported that there was a
fear among
“ordinary
people in Baghdad” that the Ba’athists could
return.21
He
assessed:
“ORHA have
made mistakes here, appointing quite senior party figures as
their
main
partners in the trade and health ministries, at Baghdad University
and so on.
Several
political leaders I have seen say a line should be drawn at the
‘firqa’ level of
the Ba’ath
Party and all those at that level and the three above should be
excluded,
about
30,000 in all. This would represent between five and ten per cent
of total party
membership.
But it is still a lot of people and may be one level too many, at
least
for now.”
34.
In one of his
earliest reports to London, on 12 May Mr Sawers reported
that
Dr Ahmed
Chalabi’s “strong message on de‑Ba’athification strikes a chord”
with the
Shia
population “and will become even more potent if we don’t deal with
re‑emerging
Ba’athists”.22
Dr Chalabi
was a founding member of the Iraqi National Congress
Party
who had
formed strong links with several US Administrations.
35.
After his
first meeting with Ambassador Bremer, Mr Sawers
reported: “Bremer, rightly,
plans to
move quickly to set out a policy on ‘de‑Ba’athification’ or
‘De‑Saddam‑isation’ as
“… the
issue needs addressing quickly. The question is how to define the
scope
of those
excluded. All agree that the top three levels of the Ba’ath …
should be
banned. Our
rough estimate suggests that should cover up to 5,000 people.
Added
20
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. Threshold,
2006.
21
Telegram 2
IraqRep to FCO London, 11 May 2003, ‘Iraq: What’s Going
Wrong?’
22
Telegram 3
IraqRep to FCO London, 12 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
23
Telegram 3
IraqRep to FCO London, 12 May 2003, ‘Iraq:
de‑Ba’athification’.
8