The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
given that
the need to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe
would
not provide
the basis for action in Iraq, the legal basis on which he thought
the
222.
In his
statement for the Inquiry, Mr Blair did not address the
substance of Lord
Goldsmith’s
advice that, in the event of a veto, there would be no Security
Council
authorisation
for the use of force.86
He
wrote:
“I never
believed that action in Iraq could be on the same legal basis as
Kosovo …
So I never
raised Kosovo as a direct precedent. However in Kosovo, we had
had
to accept
we could not get a UN resolution even though we wanted one
because
Russia had
made it clear it would wield a political veto. So we, not the UNSC,
made
the
judgement that the humanitarian catastrophe was
overwhelming.
“… [I]f it
were clear and accepted by a UNSC member that there was a breach
of
[resolution]
1441, but nonetheless they still vetoed, surely that must have
some
relevance
as to whether a breach had occurred, and thus to revival of
resolution 678
authorising
force … I was not suggesting that we, subjectively and without
more,
could say:
this is unreasonable, but that a veto in circumstances where [a]
breach
was
accepted, surely could not override the consequences of such a
breach set out
in 1441 ie
they could not make a bad faith assessment.”
“I was
aware … of Peter Goldsmith’s advice on 14 January … but … I was
also
aware that
he had not yet had the opportunity to speak to Sir Jeremy
Greenstock or
to the US
counterparty.
“I had not
yet got to the stage of a formal request for advice and neither had
he
got to the
point of formally giving it. So I was continuing to hold to the
position
that
another resolution was not necessary. I knew that the language of
1441 had
represented
a political compromise. But I also knew it had to have a meaning
and
that
meaning, in circumstances where lack of clarity was the outcome of
a political
negotiation,
must depend on what was understood by the parties to the
negotiation.
“I knew
that the US had been crystal clear and explicit throughout. This
was the
cardinal
importance of not just including the phrase ‘final opportunity’
which to me
meant ‘last
chance’; but also the designation in advance of a failure to comply
fully
and
unconditionally, as a ‘material breach’ – words with a plain and
legally defined
meaning.
“Peter’s
view at that time was, because of the word ‘assessment’ in OP4 of
1441,
there
should be a further decision. But I was aware that … had been
precisely
and openly
rejected by the US and UK when negotiating the text. That is
why
85
Inquiry
request for a witness statement, 13 December 2010, Q7, page
4.
86
Statement,
14 January 2011, pages 9-10.
46