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4.4  |  The search for WMD
“What we hoped was that maybe a military unit would run into something. But I also
remember the figure for the number of unguarded Iraqi ordnance dumps across Iraq,
and strictly speaking, all of those should have been inspected, but it was completely
impossible to do so.”66
134.  SIS4 told the Inquiry what he had expected to be found when the search began:
“It seemed to me that we had to get a fire blanket over the proliferation hazards, and
very quickly indeed …
“Secondly, while not expecting gleaming arrays of kit to be found, just curiosity
meant that we longed to get in there and find out what we had been tinkering with.
“Lastly, the Whitehall political question, ‘Well, SIS, you have been party to this high
tension pursuit of WMD. Where is it then?’
“So the need to orchestrate immediate follow-up inside Iraq on all that we knew, all
the leads, seemed to me to be very, very, very important. I was concerned that the
lead on this was going to MOD and in America, and my anxieties were borne out by
what happened. There were ammo dumps in Iraq covering square kilometres … It
was a huge task, and it needed very, very skilful and dynamic generalship to run the
follow-up. I’m afraid that didn’t happen.”67
135.  Asked whether SIS had a plan to deal with the situation, SIS4 said that he
recognised:
“… it wouldn’t be up to us. We didn’t have the staff. We didn’t have the authority. But
I did make the point repeatedly in conversations with people in Whitehall, particularly
with the military, that this needed gripping. The plan needed to be written, and
command and control put in place to make sure the plan was implemented.
“Movement inside Iraq was very tightly controlled by the military. People were being
arrested. My memory is that we did try to get access, but it was very muddled …
We put people on the ground quite quickly to be there to follow things up, but I don’t
recall any good coming out of it. At this time, of course, the military were on the
ground in Iraq. Force protection and military requirements, operational requirements
took priority.”68
136.  SIS4 expressed surprise at the relative lack of concern about WMD after the
military operation ended: “deployments remained, things were put in place, but they
weren’t being driven from the very top”.69
66  Private hearing, 13 July 2010, page 18.
67  Private hearing, [undated], Part 2, page 21.
68  Private hearing, [undated], Part 2, pages 21-22.
69  Private hearing, [undated], Part 2, page 25.
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