The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
49.
Mr Brown
told the Inquiry:
“I think
Mr Hoon wrote [to] me in June – I think the Treasury did a
paper in June
about these
very issues. I was then advised … to talk to Mr Blair. I told
him [Mr Blair]
that I
would not … try to rule out any military option on the grounds of
cost. Quite the
opposite …
we understood that some options were more expensive than others,
but
we should
accept the option that was right for our country.”42
50.
Sir David
Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser, replied to
Mr Hoon’s minute of
31 May on
25 June, stating:
“The Prime
Minister has asked for further advice on precisely what steps
would
have to be
taken now, including financial commitments, in order to keep open
the
possibility
of deploying a large‑scale force by the end of this year
…”43
51.
Mr Peter
Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary, replied to
Sir David on 26 June,
providing
an update on the MOD’s understanding of US plans.44
Mr Watkins
stated that
Mr Hoon
believed that, before committing UK forces, Ministers would want to
be clear on
four issues
including “whether the prospective outcome looks worth the risk,
costs and
losses”. A
key issue, which would determine the need to commit resources,
would be
whether the
UK could “secure adequate influence for a large‑scale
contribution”.
52.
On 5 July,
prompted by updates on US planning circulated by the MOD,
Mr Nye
advised
Mr Mark Bowman, Mr Brown’s Private Secretary, that
Mr Brown should write to
the MOD to
propose that all options for UK participation in military
operations (including
smaller and
more specialised options) should be costed, so that the Government
could
assess how
much it wished to devote – in terms of risk to UK troops, the
opportunity
cost of
withdrawing from other operations, and the financial cost – to
securing a degree
of
influence over US policy and operations.45
Mr Nye
concluded:
“No.10,
MOD, and FCO officials are likely to take as read that the UK
should
participate
if the US decides to go ahead, and on a large scale. Actually, we
have
some
choices …”
53.
The Treasury
informed the Inquiry that Mr Brown decided not to write to the
MOD.46
54.
Mr Blair
discussed Iraq with Mr Jack Straw (the Foreign Secretary),
Mr Hoon,
Lord Goldsmith
(the Attorney General), Mr Alastair Campbell
(Mr Blair’s Director
of
Communications
and Strategy), Admiral Sir Michael Boyce (Chief of the Defence
Staff)
and other
senior military officers and officials on 23 July.47
Mr Brown
was not present.
42
Public
hearing, 5 March 2010, page 14.
43
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 25 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
44
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 26 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
45
Minute Nye
to Bowman, 5 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
46
Email
Treasury [junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 26
February 2010, [untitled].
47
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting,
23 July’.
454