9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
“… it was
agreed that while deploying 16 AA Bde to Baghdad … would be
useful,
it was
not clear that it was strategically essential as the US would
achieve the
aim in time.”
389.
Cabinet Office
officials provided an Annotated Agenda to members of the
AHMGIR
for their
meeting on 22 May.260
It
said:
“ORHA’s
efficiency and ties to Washington have benefitted significantly
from
Bremer’s
arrival. He is changing ORHA’s top management. Virtually all of
Garner’s
team are
likely to go soon. Bremer is working closely with John Sawers. His
changes
have yet to
lead to significant improvement in ORHA’s performance on the ground
in
Baghdad and
elsewhere … ORHA’s capacity is increasing. It now has just
over
1,000
personnel.”
390.
The Annotated
Agenda also recorded that the Leadership Group was
“becoming
more
assertive” in the process of organising the “Baghdad Conference”
that was
intended to
select the IIA. The timing of the conference looked likely to slip
from May
to July and
the Leadership Group was proposing that it should be convened by
a
Committee
of 35 individuals, drawn from across the Governorates of
Iraq.
391.
Cabinet Office
officials wrote, “our view is that … the political process must
be
Iraq‑owned
if it is to have legitimacy in and outside Iraq” but that the US
was “uneasy
about
losing control of the selection process and, through it, the
Baghdad Conference”.
392.
The Leadership
Group was also reported to have disagreed with
Ambassador
Bremer on
what status the IIA should have. In its view, it should have real
executive
power
rather than act in support of the Coalition.
393.
Mr Straw told
the AHMGIR that Ambassador Bremer had delayed the
establishment
of the IIA, with the result that it was likely to have more members
from
within Iraq
and fewer exiles. In his view this “should make it more legitimate
in the eyes
394.
When the new
resolution was in near-final form, on 21 May FCO Legal
Advisers
asked the
Attorney General for advice on whether it would authorise the
Coalition to
undertake
action going beyond their authority as Occupying
Powers.262
395.
Resolution
1483 (2003) was adopted on 22 May.263
There were 14
votes in favour
and Syria
abstained.
260 Annotated
Agenda, 21 May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
261
Minutes, 22
May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
262
Letter
Adams to Llewellyn, 9 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Effect of Security Council
Resolution 1483 on the
Authority
of the Occupying Powers’.
263
UN Press
Release, 22 May 2003. ‘Security Council lifts sanctions on Iraq,
approves UN role, calls
for appointment
of Secretary-General’s Special Representative’
(SC/7765).
201