The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
provide
eye-witness accounts of life under Saddam Hussein and the “offer
for
the
future”. That would include a series of political announcements
which would
set the
tone for the post-Saddam Hussein era, such as oil money in a
fund
administered
by the Iraqis and a human rights decree for political, religious
and
ethnic
tolerance;
•
improve the
work on the Arab media; and
•
provide
information for European and other non-US/UK outlets.
330.
Mr Blair
concluded that each of those units would have a discrete task which
would
need to be
brought together to produce a daily briefing.
331.
A second Note
addressed funding the reconstruction of post-war Iraq
(see
Sections 9.1
and 10.3).184
332.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair had discussed the proposals in a meeting
with
Dr John
Reid (Minister without Portfolio), Ms Hilary Armstrong (Chief
Whip), Mr Douglas
Alexander
(Minister of State in the Cabinet Office) and No.10
staff.185
Mr Campbell
had
then spent
most of the day working out how to put it into practice. He added
that he had
sensed that
President Bush “was maybe sharing” Mr Blair’s “feeling that
the military
campaign
was not quite right. They were both desperate for better
communications.”
333.
Mr Blair
discussed the campaign with Mr Hoon, Adm Boyce and Maj Gen
Fry
on 31
March.
334.
On the
afternoon of 31 March, Mr Blair met Mr Hoon, Adm Boyce
and Maj Gen Fry,
for 80
minutes, to discuss Basra and the wider campaign.186
At the
request of
Mr Jonathan
Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff, Mr Rycroft provided a
“full note” setting
out the
dialogue in the meeting.
335.
In response to
a question from Mr Blair, Maj Gen Fry said that his private
estimate
was that it
would take 10 to 14 days to get to Baghdad, where there were
between
5,000 and
6,000 members of the Special Republican Guard.
336.
In relation to
Basra, Mr Rycroft recorded that Mr Blair had asked:
“How long to
tipping
point?” Adm Boyce had responded: “At least four
weeks.”
337.
Mr Blair
had referred to the “huge strategic importance of Basra” and asked
what it
would take
to “do it quicker”, including whether double the number of troops
would help.
338.
In response,
Maj Gen Fry stated that the “US don’t see the strategic importance
of
Basra the
way you do”, and that the US thought the main role in the South was
to hold
184
Letter
Manning to Rice, 31 March 2003, [untitled].
185
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
186
Minute
Rycroft to Powell, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Briefing’.
56