10.4 | Conclusions: Reconstruction

75. Mr Blair’s assessment of the contribution that reconstruction could make to

addressing insecurity in Iraq and to achieving wider UK objectives was reasonable.

While there were certainly obstacles to increasing DFID’s focus on the areas identified

by Mr Blair, including insecurity and the dominant role of the US, DFID should

have reviewed its effort in Iraq in the light of the worsening situation on the ground.

It did not do so.

76. From this point on, Mr Blair increasingly focused on pressing issues relating to the

political process, security and “Iraqiisation” (building the ability of Iraqi Security Forces to

take the lead on security within Iraq).

77. By the end of 2004, the obstacles to delivering reconstruction in the South were

clear.

78. Insecurity remained the most serious obstacle to progress.

79. The UK had been pressing the US to move quickly to establish a reconstruction

presence in the South since the transition to the IIG in June 2004. In December, officials

confirmed that the US intended to focus on reconstruction projects that had a more

immediate and visible impact at the expense of larger, longer‑term projects, and was

likely to reallocate funding from more to less stable areas of Iraq. That meant less US

funding for the South. Mr Chakrabarti reported that:

“As junior partners in the coalition, our ideas are listened to, but our influence over

US spending will remain limited. We need to face up to the fact: the South will not be

a strategic priority for the US.”23

80. At the same time, concerns grew over the capacity of the Iraqi Government to lead

and manage the reconstruction effort. Faster progress on reconstruction was unlikely

without greater Iraqi capacity, and building that capacity could take years. A particular

concern for the UK was the weakness of the relationship between Baghdad and Basra.

That relationship would become increasingly difficult.

81. The UN and World Bank continued to limit their presence on the ground in Iraq.

82. Reports from Iraq highlighted that progress in delivering essential services, and in

particular power, had fallen far below Iraqi expectations.

83. DFID concluded in December 2004 that it would “have to take more of the strain

bilaterally in 2005”.24 Planned support for infrastructure in the South would be brought

forward.

23 Minute Chakrabarti and Drummond to Secretary of State [DFID], 13 December 2004, ‘Iraq Visit,

6‑8 December’.

24 Minute Chakrabarti and Drummond to Secretary of State [DFID], 13 December 2004, ‘Iraq Visit,

6‑8 December’.

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