The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
military or
civilian capacity to fulfil its likely obligations in the South in
a range of
circumstances,
including:
•
in the
prolonged absence of an authorising resolution;
•
in the
absence of additional Coalition partners;
•
in a
hostile security environment with low levels of Iraqi consent;
and
•
over
different timescales, in particular the medium and long
term.
703.
Each of
those issues had been identified as a potential risk to UK
strategic
objectives
in Iraq, but no detailed contingency plans or preparations were in
place
to mitigate
those risks.
704.
Guidance on
the principles and application of international humanitarian
law
(IHL) was
disseminated to those engaged at all levels in military action
through
a number of
different mechanisms.
705.
The CDS
Directive to CJO on 18 March 2003, the ‘Execute Directive to the
Joint
Commander
for Operation TELIC’, set out: the situation and legal basis for
operations;
the UK
Government’s political, strategic and military objectives; the
concept of
operations
and detailed instructions for the mission.253
It included
a paragraph to
the effect
that all military operations, by UK forces and from UK territory,
were to be
conducted
in accordance with the UK’s Obligations under the Law of Armed
Conflict
(otherwise
known as IHL) and UK national law.
706.
The principles
of IHL are set out in the Box earlier in this Section, ‘Overview
of
international
humanitarian law’.
707.
The CDS
Directive also contained a number of annexes, including a
Targeting
Directive
and a draft Rules of Engagement (ROE) profile, although at the time
of issue
that had
not yet been authorised by Ministers.
708.
ROE are
explained in the Box below.
253
Directive
CDS to CJO, 18 March 2003, ‘Chief of Defence Staff Execute
Directive to the Joint
Commander
Operation TELIC, Edition 2’.
500