The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
507.
Asked whether
President Chirac’s statement was “simply saying what
everybody
already
knew, and what to a degree had already been said by the French in
public”,
Sir Jeremy
replied:
“Yes, but
saying it at Presidential level very publicly changed the political
effect
of the French
position on the rest of the Security Council.”159
508.
Sir Jeremy
subsequently told the Inquiry that the effect of the statement
had
“considerably
lessened” the chances of turning the middle-ground six round
and
“therefore
it was quite an important turning point in the public
politics”.160
President
Chirac’s
statement had an impact “on the little tiny bit of momentum we
still had in
the Security
Council with the middle ground”.
509.
Sir Jeremy
stated that:
“… we knew
we had only a minority chance of achieving a second
resolution … but
with the
United States in the game pulling out all the stops, you never
quite know
when
countries opposing them may be pulled into another
position.”161
510.
Asked what, at
the beginning of the negotiation, he had thought the
chances
of success
in the second resolution were, Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the
Inquiry:
“Less than
50 percent.”162
Sir Jeremy
added that hindsight discoloured his recollection
but,
“in my mind, between a quarter and a third of
a chance that we might do this”.
He “wasn’t
advising London that we were likely to succeed”.
511.
Asked about
his statement that the UK never had more than four firm
votes,
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock replied:
“Right at
the end. We knew we had four. We were after those six to make it
ten, the
middle-ground
members. Each of those six at some point during February, as
they
were being
chased round by Baroness Amos and others, trying to persuade
them in
their
capitals to follow us, said that they might do it or were going to
follow us, and
then backed
off when they saw that the others weren’t following. So we were
herding
cats
unsuccessfully in that respect, and never got all six together to
have confidence
in each
other’s preparedness to do it.”163
512.
Sir David
Manning did not think that the middle-ground six would have
supported
action in
the timeframe that was under discussion:
“… if there
had been more time, I think that the six in the UN – their minds
weren’t
necessarily
closed … if you had got a different dynamic going in February,
March,
April
between the leaders on the basis of whatever Blix was saying, and
there
159
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, page 33.
160
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, page 34.
161
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, page 30.
162
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, page 32.
163
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, page 32.
488