9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
88.
The paper
reported that Maj Gen Shaw considered that Basra was ready for
PIC
and had
made that recommendation to the MNF command. Lt Gen Odierno had
turned
down the
proposal, arguing that the new Basra security and leadership
structures
needed time
to demonstrate positive progress; he thought PIC in October might
be
achievable,
based on a decision in September. The paper said:
“… we will
need to continue to hold Iraqi and US feet to the fire if we wish
to achieve
PIC in the
autumn …
“The risk …
remains that if we try to force a positive decision in the teeth of
US
opposition
and lukewarm Iraqi attitudes, we will reinforce the American belief
that we
are doing
so for political reasons, driven by our desire to reduce UK troop
levels.”
89.
The paper
explained that the next key decision for Ministers was the timing
of the
withdrawal
from Basra Palace, the “most heavily mortared and rocketed place in
Iraq”.
That was
complicated because:
•
Withdrawing
from Basra Palace “will mark de
facto handover of
responsibility”
to the ISF;
re-intervention by UK forces from the Air Station would happen
only
in
extremis. A gap of a month or two between withdrawal and PIC
“should be
manageable”
but a “significantly longer gap would put UK forces in a
difficult
position:
responsible for security in Basra City, but unable to deliver it
except at
high
risk”.
•
The
potential for an upsurge in violence surrounding the withdrawal,
and the
impact that
might have in Washington in the run-up to Gen Petraeus
and
Ambassador
Crocker’s Congress hearing in September.
•
The risk of
looting – “it would be disastrous for our reputation if our
departure
were
followed by the sort of looting at Basra Palace which happened at
bases
in Muthanna
and Maysan provinces after we handed them to the Iraqis”. It
was
therefore
essential that a credible ISF guard force was in place before the
UK
could
withdraw.
•
The impact
on the UK’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) effort in Basra,
currently
co-ordinated
from the PJCC, where 100 UK troops and seven UK police
advisers
were based. The threat to these staff if there were no
significant
MND(SE)
presence at Basra Palace would be impossibly high because
“there
would be no
quick way to get reinforcements to the site or to evacuate
UK
personnel
in an emergency”. As a result, the paper concluded that a
withdrawal
from Basra
Palace would mean closing the UK base at PJCC, and so
halting
SSR work
and losing “situational intelligence within Basra
City”.
90.
Considering
the scope for the UK to make a contribution to Basra’s
development
in the
period beyond PIC, the paper observed that the situation was likely
to remain
challenging.
UK activity within Basra was “already heavily circumscribed” by
both the
security
situation and the willingness of the population to engage with UK
personnel.
This was
likely to increase after PIC.
201