The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
After the
strikes, the US Government stated they “had dealt with the issue
of
eliminating
the vestiges of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
programmes,
although
the relevant information was not given to the Security
Council”.177
•
Through its
“acts of provocation” the former UNSCOM had “fully discredited
itself
and
simultaneously undermined the pre‑December 1998 prospects for
reaching
a
comprehensive settlement”.
•
The
“Council then found itself in a profound crisis not of its own
making on the
question of
Iraq and for a long time was unable to get out of the
impasse”.
•
Resolution
1284 “allowed us to renew the inspections on a new
genuinely
international
basis”, but it “contained extremely ambiguous criteria
for
suspension
of the sanctions”. That gave individual Council members
the
opportunity
“to maintain the embargo indefinitely”. Russia had made
proposals
to give
“concrete substance to the criteria of sanctions suspension in the
context
of a
comprehensive settlement”, which remained extant.
•
The
Security Council had implemented the provisions of resolution 1382
(2001)
in respect
of the creation of a Goods Review List, but it had not pursued
the
“commitment
to a comprehensive settlement on the basis of existing
Council
decisions”.
•
Russia
would “do its utmost to prevent a renewal” of Iraq’s WMD
programmes,
and was
“prepared to co‑operate” on that “with all States”. But Russia,
“like all
unbiased
observers”, had “not seen any kind of persuasive evidence that
there
are weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq or programmes to develop them”.
Nor
had it
“seen any other facts that would situate Iraq in the context of
combating
terrorism”.
•
The
“immediate redeployment of the international inspectors to Iraq”
was the
“only way
to remove any doubts”.
552.
Mr Lavrov
stated that Iraq had “consented” to an unconditional return of
inspectors
and the
“new, enhanced and very effective parameters for conducting
inspections”.
There was
“everything we need to ensure there is no renewal of the proscribed
military
programmes
in Iraq” and for “a political and diplomatic settlement of the
crisis”. There
was “no
need to delay deployment” of the inspectors. He added:
“If the
Council has a prevailing desire to give further support to UNMOVIC
and the
IAEA in the
interest of the effective implementation of the existing
resolutions … we
will be
prepared to look at the relevant proposals, including and based on
the great
importance
of maintaining Council unity.”
553.
In his
concluding remarks, Mr Lavrov stated that Russia was “calling
for collective
steps by
the international community” and unilateral actions did “not
facilitate the efforts
177
The UK
assessment of the impact of Operation Desert Fox is set out in
Section 4.1.
300