The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
63.
Lt Gen Reith
sent an assessment of the threat in the UK’s Area of Operations
to
Admiral
Sir Michael Boyce, CDS, on 29 March.26
In his
covering minute, Lt Gen Reith
wrote that
predictions about the latter stages of Phases III and IV were “more
difficult to
ascertain”
and they largely depended on “the progress of the Coalition
campaign, forces
assigned to
security tasks, etc”. He continued:
“However,
for the moment we are dealing with a spectrum of threats ranging
from
regular to
terrorism. As we progress operations the regular forces threat will
be
eliminated
and we will eventually be left with a residual terrorist threat, as
is already
the case in
some areas we control, such as Umm Qasr.”
64.
The assessment
stated that the threat, in addition to the indirect threats posed
by
surface to
surface missiles, fell broadly into three categories:
•
Conventional
forces where Coalition Forces do not hold ground and
RA
[Iraqi Regular
Army] forces are still deployed.
•
“Asymmetric
forces” including Fedayeen, Ba’ath Party officials and
militia,
“other regime
officials”, opportunists and criminals and the dissatisfied
population.
•
Foreign
terrorists including Palestinian and “other committed Islamic
groups”
and the
Iraq‑based Iranian dissident group Mujahideen e Khalq (MEK) who
were
“known” to
operate in the South of Iraq. There was “no physical evidence
of
these
threats materialising as yet”.
65.
On 3 April,
Lt Gen Reith produced a draft “operational concept” for
Phase IV.27
He wrote
that Phase IV operations would begin in southern Iraq “within days”
but that
the
backdrop to their implementation was “uncertain and changing”. The
baseline
conditions
from which they would operate were “far from clear” and “important
issues”,
such as the
level of military involvement, remained unresolved. While the paper
detailed
the
military’s potential tasks and capability, its focus was on force
levels and it did not
cover
equipment.
66.
The Inquiry
has seen no evidence of any further comments on the
draft.
67.
The record of
Lord Bach’s meeting on 14 April stated:
“Phase IV
UORs remain a problem. Although CJO [Lt Gen Reith] has a
draft in hand,
we are
still without a defined CONOPS. This limits our ability to plan for
and procure
26
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS, 29 March 2003, ‘Iraq – The Threat Within UK’s AO’
attaching Paper
[undated],
‘Iraq – UK AO – Threat Assessment’.
27
Paper
Reith, 3 April 2003, ‘Operation TELIC Phase 4 the Joint Commander’s
Draft Operational
Concept’.
28
Minute
APS/Min(DP) to MA/DCDS(EC), 14 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC –
UORs’.
14