The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This section
addresses:
•
the
statements issued by the Government before the conflict on the
human
rights
abuses committed by Saddam Hussein’s regime and the human cost
of
not
intervening in Iraq;
•
the
assessments made by the Government before and during initial
combat
operations
of the number of Iraqi civilian casualties;
•
reports of
the number of Iraqi civilian casualties during initial
combat
operations; and
•
how the
Government responded to demands that it should count the
number
of Iraqi
casualties attributable to the conflict, and to estimates of the
number
of casualties.
2.
As this
Section shows, there have been a number of studies to determine the
civilian
death toll
in Iraq after the Coalition invasion. The numbers vary
considerably. What is
not in
doubt is that, in both the military operation to overthrow the
Iraqi regime and the
subsequent
violence, many tens of thousands of Iraqi citizens, most of them
civilians,
lost their
lives. Many more were displaced or injured, or lost members of
their families.
3.
It is beyond
the scope and abilities of this Inquiry to establish independently
the
number of
fatalities caused by conflict in Iraq, or the broader human cost of
the conflict
to the
Iraqi people. The Inquiry is, however, very conscious of the extent
of the suffering
in Iraq
resulting from the conflict and this has informed its approach to
its analysis of the
course of
the conflict and to drawing lessons for the future.
•
The Inquiry
considers that a Government has a responsibility to make
every
reasonable
effort to understand the likely and actual effects of its military
actions on
civilians.
•
In the months
before the invasion, Mr Blair emphasised the need to minimise
the
number of
civilian casualties arising from an invasion of Iraq. The MOD’s
responses
offered
reassurance based on the tight targeting procedures governing the
air
campaign.
•
The MOD made
only a broad estimate of direct civilian casualties arising from
an
attack on
Iraq, based on previous operations.
•
With
hindsight, greater efforts should have been made in the
post‑conflict period
to
determine the number of civilian casualties and the broader effects
of military
operations
on civilians. More time was devoted to the question of which
department
should have
responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties than it was to
efforts to
determine
the actual number.
•
The
Government’s consideration of the issue of Iraqi civilian
casualties was driven by
its concern
to rebut accusations that coalition forces were responsible for the
deaths
of large
numbers of civilians, and to sustain domestic support for
operations in Iraq.
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