9.1 | March to 22 May 2003

Representative had been at work before the resolution had passed, and before the

creation of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

89. On 2 April, Mr Llewellyn wrote again to the IPU about the legality of ORHA actions.42

90. Activity around Umm Qasr, which was under UK control, pointed to the fact

that ORHA was acting on behalf of Coalition forces jointly. That made it increasingly

important that the UK Government was consulted on its plans. Mr Llewellyn urged the

IPU to exert whatever influence it had to ensure that happened.

91. Mr Straw and Secretary Powell met in Brussels on 3 April. The Government has

been unable to provide the Inquiry with a record of their discussion. But in advance of

the meeting, the IPU provided Mr Straw with advice on how an IIA might be created,

for him to share with Secretary Powell.43

92. In its advice, the IPU set out concerns about the legal constraints in creating an

Iraqi administration:

“Without UN authorisation, any bodies set up or decisions taken on issues other

than delivery of humanitarian relief, rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, security

or public order, whether by the Coalition or others, would not fall within the authority

of Occupying Powers and would therefore be illegal. This applies to the formation of

an interim administration and any constitutional changes and reform programmes.

The US have a different interpretation of the legal position. They need to be clear

about the constraints which apply to UK activity, including our participation in ORHA.

The strongest argument is however political: we need a UN-authorised process to

provide the right people to participate in the interim authority and to gain maximum

support from Iraqis and internationally. We see the UN Special Co-ordinator/

Representative visibly facilitating the process leading to the IIA’s establishment with

the Coalition in the background. The US view, across government, is the opposite.”

93. A paper attached to the IPU advice described the possible steps in the process of

political reconstruction in Iraq as:

“• The establishment of a Consultative Council at a national level and Joint

Commissions at a local level to advise and act as the interface with the Coalition

transitional military and civil administration.

• A process to select an IIA, such as a conference similar to the Bonn Conference

for Afghanistan.

• Formation of an IIA.

• A constitutional review process.

42 Minute Llewellyn to Bristow, 2 April 2003, [untitled].

43 Minute IPU [junior official] to PS [FCO], 2 April 2003, ‘Post-Conflict Iraq: Iraqi Interim Authority’ attaching

Paper FCO Research Analysts, ‘Post-conflict Iraq: Iraqi Interim Authority’.

147