The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
in Basra,
and concerns about the impact of the UK’s proposed re‑posturing
and
drawdown.266
Mr Blair
judged that the UK’s plans for re‑posturing would have to
include:
•
a greater
focus on embedding and continued support for police and
security
force
reform, including the provision of equipment (see Section
12.1);
•
continued
operations targeting the JAM leadership, including after
re‑posturing;
and
•
further
action with Iraqis to ensure that criminal cases were pursued
against
JAM and
other criminal elements in the Basra police.
500.
On 31 January,
Maj Gen Shaw reported:
“Gen Casey
is clear that PIC for Basra (and elsewhere) is moving to the right
and
there are
no signs that Gen Petraeus will be any more forward leaning … The
Iraqis,
of course,
have a strong say in this, but there are signs that PM Maliki may
too wish
to push
things further to the right …
“Questions
have been asked about the relevance of delayed PIC to our plans
for
a re‑postured
force at [Basra Air Station] …
“All this
led me to judge that … keeping Basra Palace open beyond our
original
timelines
may need to be considered …
“Maintaining
a foothold in the city until PIC will allow us to retain our
(already
limited) …
situation awareness coverage of the city. The Shia political
appetite … for
our
counter‑militia strikes allows us a political freedom of operation
to exploit this …
by targeted
strike operations, both counter IDF/JAM and (an emerging
imperative)
counter‑malign
Iranian influence. This shift in political attitudes is
significant, and is
a major
shift since Operation SALAMANCA was proposed and tellingly
rejected.”267
501.
Maj Gen Shaw
continued that he considered:
“… the UK
and US are viewing Iraq through the optics of different timelines.
There
is no
coalition consensus about what is ‘Iraqi good enough’ and a frank
political
conversation
is needed to determine what the shared vision is.”
502.
At the end of
January 2007, the US National Intelligence Council published
its
assessment
of what was necessary to stabilise the situation in
Iraq.268
It
said:
“Iraqi
society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the
security forces
and the
state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are
collectively
driving an
increase in communal and insurgent violence and political
extremism.
266
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 29 January 2007, ‘Iraq’.
267
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 31 January 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 24
[sic]
January
2007’.
268
Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence
Estimate, January 2007, Prospects
for Iraq’s
Stability: a Challenging Road Ahead.
94