The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

178. Mr Blair concluded that for moral and strategic reasons the UK should be with the

US and that:

“… [W]e should make a last ditch attempt for a peaceful solution. First to make

the moral case for removing Saddam … Second, to try one more time to reunite

the international community behind a clear base for action in the event of a

continuing breach.”

179. On 3 March, Mr Blair proposed an approach focused on setting a deadline of

17 March for Iraq to disclose evidence relating to the destruction of prohibited items

and permit interviews; and an amnesty if Saddam Hussein left Iraq by 21 March.80

180. Mr Straw told Secretary Powell that the level of support in the UK for military action

without a second resolution was palpably “very low”. In that circumstance, even if a

majority in the Security Council had voted for the resolution with only France exercising

its veto, he was “increasingly pessimistic” about support within the Labour Party for

military action.81 The debate in the UK was:

“… significantly defined by the tone of the debate in Washington and particularly

remarks made by the President and others to the right of him, which suggested that

the US would go to war whatever and was not bothered about a second resolution

one way or another.”

181. Following a discussion with Mr Blair, Mr Straw told Secretary Powell that Mr Blair:

“… was concerned that, having shifted world (and British) public opinion over the

months, it had now been seriously set back in recent days. We were not in the right

position. The Prime Minister was considering a number of ideas which he might well

put to the President.”82

182. Mr Straw recorded that Secretary Powell had advised that, if Mr Blair wanted

to make proposals, he should do so quickly. The US was not enthusiastic about the

inclusion of an immunity clause for Saddam Hussein in the resolution.

183. Mr Straw reported that Secretary Powell had told President Bush that he judged

a vetoed resolution would no longer be possible for the UK. Mr Straw said that without

a second resolution approval for military action could be “beyond reach”.

184. Mr Straw told the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) on 4 March that it was “a matter

of fact” that Iraq had been in material breach “for some weeks” and resolution 1441

provided sufficient legal authority to justify military action against Iraq if it was “in further

material breach”.83

80 Note (handwritten) [Blair], 3 March 2003, [untitled].

81 Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 3 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Second Resolution’.

82 Letter Straw to Manning, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Colin Powell, 3 March’.

83 Minutes, Foreign Affairs Committee (House of Commons), 4 March 2003, [Evidence Session],

Qs 151 and 154.

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